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GO WORLD

MARCH-APRIL 1979 NO.12



Victory in the fourth game gives Fujisawa Shuko an iron grip on the Kisei title. Looking on is Yasunaga Hajime, one of Japan's representatives in the first world amateur Go championship.

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The cover: A hanging scroll (kakejiku) from the Narita Collection depicting the seven gods of good fortune. The landscape includes traditional symbols of good luck — mountains and a river, pine, bamboo and plum — and is actually a New Year theme.

Go World is published by The Ishi Press.
Address subscriptions to The Ishi Press,
Inc. CPO Box 2126, Tokyo.
Editor: John Power

Yearly subscription rate: ¥4,380 (6 issues by seaimail)
Price per single issue: ¥730
Airmail rate: ¥6,200 per year; ¥1,050 per single issue
(Discounts are available for bulk orders by seaimail)

Note: Japanese, Chinese and Korean names are given with the family name first.

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GO WORLD NEWS



Shuko Wins Shusai Prize

On the 23rd January, the day before the start of the second game of the 3rd Kisei title match, it was announced that Fujisawa Shuko had been awarded the 16th Shusai Prize as the outstanding player of 1978. This is Shuko's first Shusai prize and the main factor swaying the judges was clearly his outstanding achievement in defending the Kisei title at the beginning of last year. Just for the record, the previous recipients of the prize are Rin Kaiho (four times), Ishida and Sakata (each three times), Kato (twice), Otake, Takagawa and Take-miya. Perhaps encouraged by this award, Shuko duly won his game in the current Kisei title match.

Kido Prizes for 1978

In its March issue every year the Nihon Ki-in magazine 'Kido' announces a number of prizes for the outstanding players of the previous year. The players below were recognised as the stars of 1978.

1. The outstanding player of the year: Kato Masao, Honinbo, Judan & Tengen

Last year Kato appeared in five out of the top seven title matches and won three of them. This feat prevailed against the other main candidate, Otake, winner of the Meijin and Gosei titles.

2. The highest number of wins (7-dan up): Otake with 39 wins, 16 losses

3. Best winning percentage (7-dan up): Hane Yasumasa 8-dan — 34 wins, 7 losses for an 82.9% record

4. Most consecutive wins (7-dan up): Otake with 13 wins in a row (next was Cho Chikun with 12)

5. The special merit prize: Yamashiro Hiroshi 6-dan (record: 26 wins, 7 losses, 1 jigo; won a place in the Meijin league, had a 6-3 record against 9-dans)

6. The fighting spirit prize: Hane Yasumasa (reached the Tengen semi-final; scored 10 wins in a row)



Hane


7. The prize for technique: Ishida Akira (won the 3rd Shinjin-O title; outstanding performance in the Judan tournament)

8. The outstanding woman player: Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan. Though Ogawa's challenge for the Women's Honinbo title was unsuccessful, her record of 21 wins, 12 losses, 1 jigo put her way ahead of the other woman players.

9. The 'new face' prize: O Rissei (won 4-dan section of the 4th Kisei title; record: 30 wins, 11 losses)



Ishida Akira



O Rissei

Kansai Ki-in Prizes for 1978

1. The outstanding player – not awarded (leading candidates were Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan and Ushinohama 9-dan)

2. The Risen Prize (fighting spirit) – Ushinohama Satsuo 9-dan (record 14 wins to 8 losses; entered Meijin league; did well in the 3rd Kisei title). This prize is a memorial to Sekiyama Riichi, who as the 1st Honinbo took the name of Risen.

3. The Dogen Prize (special merit—open to players under 9-dan) – Kurahashi Shozo 7-dan. This prize is a memorial to the late Handa Dogen 9-dan.

4. The New Face Prize – Inoue Kaname 4-dan (27 wins, 9 losses; best winning percentage at 75%; took 1st place in the 2nd section of the oteai)

A Statistical Overview of 1978

It may be of some interest to look at some of the statistics for the 1978 tournament year, beginning with the ostensible object of all that intense intellectual activity, money. The Nihon Ki-in made public a list of the top ten winners of prize money in tournament Go last year. As we go to press, the U.S. dollar is around the 200 yen mark, which is quite healthy considering the depths it plunged to during 1978.

Top Ten Prize-winners

1. Kato Masao: ¥40,200,000 (approx. \$200,000)
2. Otake Hideo: ¥30,400,000
3. Fujisawa Shuko: ¥28,400,000
4. Ishida Yoshio: ¥18,600,000
5. Rin Kaiho: ¥16,100,000
6. Sakata Eio: ¥12,900,000
7. Kudo Norio: ¥10,900,000
8. Cho Chikun: ¥8,200,000
9. Takemiya Masaki: ¥6,300,000
10. Kobayashi Koichi: ¥5,900,000

The level of Kato's earnings set a new record for a professional Go player, this being the first time that the forty million yen barrier had been broken. However, there is quite a distressing drop from the top few money-earners to the number ten player. When one considers that there are only a score or so players who are in serious contention for the major titles, it becomes obvious that most of the close to four hundred professional players in Japan do not live on their tournament winnings. Of course, even in the case of the players above, the sums listed represent only a fraction of their income, as this is supplemented by lesson fees, fees for game commentaries and TV appearances

etc. and royalties for books published under their names (in Japan the same basic body of Go material is rearranged and published as a 'new' book every time a top title changes hands).

Middle and lower level professionals have to rely on their teaching for their livelihood, though in the past couple of years everyone's bank account has been considerably brightened by the greatly increased prize-money arising from the Asahi (Meijin sponsor) and Yomiuri newspaper (Kisei sponsor, formerly the Meijin sponsor) dispute. Talking to average 'run-of-the-mill' professionals, one gets the impression that if they are prepared to do a couple of hours teaching a day, they do a fair bit better than salaried university graduates of the same age. One drawback of being a professional, however, is that the continual competitiveness of Go-playing makes many of them addicted to various forms of gambling for relaxation, so how much of their income they keep is another matter.

Let's see how the above list correlates with lists of the best performers during 1978.

Highest number of wins

1. Otake: 39 wins, 16 losses
2. Ishida Yoshio: 38 – 18
3. Cho Chikun: 36 – 14
4. Hane: 34 – 17
4. Kobayashi Koichi: 34 – 15
6. Sakata: 32 – 11
7. Kato: 30 – 20
8. Nakamura Shidehito 7-dan: 27 – 10
9. Sakai Takeshi 8-dan: 27 – 15
10. Takemiya: 25 – 12

Conspicuous by his absence is Fujisawa Shuko, whose record last year of 19 wins – 13 losses (59.4%) was actually a considerable improvement on his 1977 record. As the standard joke goes, however, Shuko only has to win four games a year to stay on top of the Go world. Just missing the list were Kudo and Rin, with records of 25 – 24 and 23 – 9 respectively.

Best winning percentage

1. Hane: 82.9% (34 – 7)
2. Sakata: 74.4% (32 – 11)
3. Kojima 8-dan: 73.3% (22 – 8)
4. Nakamura Shidehito 7-dan: 73% (27 – 10)
5. Cho: 72% (36 – 14)
6. Rin: 71.9% (23 – 9)
7. Otake: 70.9% (39 – 16)
8. Kobayashi Koichi: 69.4% (34 – 15)
9. Ishida Akira: 69.4% (25 – 11)

10. Takemiya: 67.6% (25 – 12)
(This list is also restricted to 7-dans and up.)

1978 Game Statistics

For another side of the picture, here are some different statistics for the tournament year. The figures below cover all newspaper and rating tournament games, excluding TV games. They include games between Nihon Ki-in and Kansai Ki-in players but not games between Kansai Ki-in players.

Newspaper tournaments

Last year the 243 active players affiliated with the Nihon Ki-in played a total of 1791 games in newspaper tournaments. The komi in all cases was $5\frac{1}{2}$ points, given by black. Of these, black won 966 or 53.9%, while white won 825 or 46.1%. It is clear that black has an advantage, but it is perhaps slighter than often thought.

The key point is the komi: formerly $4\frac{1}{2}$ points was more common, but tournament by tournament it has been revised to $5\frac{1}{2}$ (the last major hold-out was the Honinbo tournament, which switched over in late 1974 for the 30th title). Of the above 1791 games, 104 were half point decisions, of which 49 were won by white. These 49 are the games which black would have won under the $4\frac{1}{2}$ point komi system. However, any consideration of this factor has to take into account the fact that professionals vary their play according to the komi. The $5\frac{1}{2}$ point komi is commonly referred to as a 'large komi' and white consequently often adopts a leisurely strategy, while black feels an onus on him to play sharply.

The great majority of games were won by resignation, but it is interesting to note that 59 wins of 10 points or more were played out and counted. The biggest win actually counted was one by $25\frac{1}{2}$ points, closely followed by two $23\frac{1}{2}$ point wins.

Rating tournament (oteai)

All players under 9-dan participate in the oteai, held in spring and autumn. These are now the only regular games which are played without a komi and in which the dan differences are observed in deciding the handicap. One dan used to be considered as equivalent to one third of a stone but is now slightly less. In practice, with a one dan difference the lower-ranked player takes black in two games out of three, while with a two dan difference he takes black in all games. With a three dan difference he also takes black in all games but is awarded more promotion points

than in the case of a two dan difference. There are no handicap games, as players more than three dan different in rank are not matched.

The result of this system is that the lower-ranked player has black in a majority of games and this accounts for a surprising coincidence. In the two oteai sessions last year at the Nihon Ki-in a total of 784 games were played, with black winning 418 or 53.3%, a fractionally lower rate than in komi games, though one might have expected black to do better without the burden of the komi. Of these 784 games only 19 or 2.43% ended in jigo (a win for white). A further 46 were one point wins, while 23 games with a margin of ten or more were played out to the bitter end.

3rd Kisei Title – Shuko Holding Ishida at Bay

Once a year that exuberant bon vivant Fujisawa Shuko is transformed into Shuko the Go player. When the Kisei season comes round early in the New Year Shuko swears off the whisky and the late nights and devotes himself to getting into condition for the gruelling best-of-seven series.

'I am staking my life as a professional Go player on this title match' was the ringing declaration with which Shuko greeted Ishida Yoshio, this year's challenger. Ishida is a veteran of seven-game series, but he seems to have been overwhelmed by Shuko's fighting spirit and his fierce determination to hang onto the Kisei title. Shuko has held this title since its inception and already he has swept to an ominous 3–1 lead over the challenger. Even in the game he lost, Shuko outplayed Ishida only to throw the game away with one of his notorious 'poka' or blunders. Ishida is now faced with the grim prospect of three kadobans.

Results to date:

Game 1 (Jan. 12, 13). Shuko (W) won by $3\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Game 2 (Jan. 24, 25). Shuko (B) won by resig.

Game 3 (Feb. 7, 8). Ishida won by $2\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Game 4 (Feb. 21, 22). Shuko (B) won by resig.

34th Honinbo League

The current Honinbo league is close to the half-way mark, with the best start having been made by Sakata Eio. Apart from Sakai Takeshi 8-dan, however, who is already doomed to demotion, all other players are still in the running.

4th Meijin League

Former Honinbo Takemiya Masaki 9-dan has compensated for his poor start in the Honinbo

34th Honinbo League (as of 23rd February)

Rank	Name	I	T	R	K	K	S	T	S	Score
1	Ishida	—				1				1-0
2	Takemiya		—	0		0		1	1	2-2
3	Rin		1	—	0					1-1
4	Kobayashi			1	—			0	1	2-1
5	Kudo	0	1			—			1	2-1
5	Sakata						—	1	1	2-0
5	Takagi		0		1		0	—		1-2
5	Sakai		0		0	0	0		—	0-4

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

league by taking the early lead in the Meijin league. A major upset has already occurred, with the newcomer Yamashiro 6-dan defeating Sakata, while Kato Masao, one of the favourites, made a dismal start with successive losses to Rin and Sakata. Also worthy of note is the excellent showing of the great veteran Hashimoto Uтаро of the Kansai Ki-in, who turned seventy-two in February.

Hashimoto Shoji to Challenge Kato Judan

Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan earned the right to challenge Kato Masao for the 17th Judan title by defeating Ishida Akira 7-dan in the playoff held on the 16th February. Hashimoto, the leading Kansai Ki-in player after Hashimoto Uтаро, won the 12th Judan title in 1974, defeating Sakata Eio 3-1, but since losing to Rin the following



Hashimoto Shoji wins the Judan playoff

4th Meijin League (as of 23rd February)

Rank	Name	R	K	S	C	H	I	U	T	Y	Score
1	Rin	—	1	0				1			2-1
2	Kato	0	—	0		1					1-2
3	Sakata	1	1	—						0	2-1
4	Cho				—	0		0			0-2
5	Hashimoto		0		1	—	1				2-1
6	Ishida					0	—				0-1
7	Ushinohama	0			1			—	0		1-2
7	Takemiya							1	—	1	2-0
7	Yamashiro			1					0	—	1-1

Note: the players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

year he has been without a title, so he will be anxious to make the most of this opportunity. A victory for him would also bolster the prestige of the Kansai Ki-in, which has been in a bit of a slump in recent years.

Past encounters are never a reliable guide to a title match, but just for the record Hashimoto holds the edge over Kato with four wins to two losses.

Kang Wins 1978 U. S. Championship

The final of the 1978 U. S. Championship was held in New York on the 10th December at the 5th Avenue office of Japan Air Lines. In the best-of-three series, the Eastern Champion, Shin A. Kang, defeated the Western Champion, Shigeo Matsuhara, 2-0.

First World Amateur Go Championship

The final details for this championship, which is being held from the 13th to the 17th March at the Nihon Ki-in Tokyo, have now been confirmed. The team captain for North America is Richard Dolen, while the Chinese captain is Hu Ch'ang-jung. Unfortunately, the number of players has been reduced to thirty, as the U.S.S. R. representative V. Astashkin was not able to attend, while one of the Korean players, Kim Byong Jun, has also withdrawn. 'Go World' will present a full report on this event in our next issue.

Correction. Since referring in our last issue to Ronald Schlemper of Holland as the youngest competitor, we have learned that Daniel Leiberman 1-dan of Argentina is four years Schlemper's junior. Daniel is only fourteen, which must be close to a record for international competition in a board game.



Daniel Leiberman

Note. The Nihon Ki-in has prepared a partial translation of its rules, with some modifications (see the article by James Davies in this issue),

for the tournament. The booklet, entitled 'The First World Amateur Go Championship Rules', is 48 pages in length and is available from the Ishi Press for ¥300, including postage.

First Scandinavian Go Tournament

The First Scandinavian Go Tournament was held in Goteborg on the 13th and 14th January this year. Seven players competed in the top group, which was won by Georg Frontzler 3-dan, formerly of Austria, now a Swedish citizen, with 5 wins to 1 loss. Richard Hirsch of the U.S. took second place with 4-2, while Dix Sandback of Denmark came third, also with 4-2.

Twelve players participated in the second group, the winner being Ulf Olsson 6-kyu.

'Go - Revue Francaise de Go'

Go activity in France has taken another step forward with the appearance of a national magazine produced by a group of French players in conjunction with the Federation Francaise de Go. The magazine is a quarterly and the subscription rate is 20FF. within France and 40 FF. overseas. The first issue has already been published and features an article on the French championship. For further information, contact:

Go - Revue Francaise de Go
3, Allee du Bois
Les Authieux
76520 BOOS
France

Yugoslav Go Association

On the 27th October last year the different Go organisations in Yugoslavia banded together to form the Yugoslav Go Association. Mr. Jankovic Srba was elected president. The contact address is:

Go Savez Jugoslavije
Postanski Fah 36
11070 Beograd
Yugoslavia

The first Open Go Tournament was held at the same time, being organised by the Beograd Go Club, and the winner was Koncer Slobodan 3-dan of Rijeka.

News in Brief

Sakata Wins 60th Title

On the 17th February Sakata Eio defeated Fujisawa Shuko by resignation in the final of the Asia Air Lines Cup, a TV hayago tournament, thus winning his sixtieth title. This figure is an

(Continued on page 40)

26th Oza Title

For two and a half years, since losing his Honinbo title to Takemiya in July 1976, Ishida has been without a title, a most unaccustomed position for a player who captured twelve titles in the first half of the 1970's. After his setback in last year's Honinbo title match against Kato, when he came within an ace of victory, Ishida must have become all the more determined to secure the Oza title.

In the final elimination round Ishida was matched against Rin Kaiho, his great rival in Meijin and Honinbo title matches in the past. Rin must have been no less eager to win, having just lost the Meijin title to Otake.

Final Round: Ishida v. Rin

White: Rin Kaiho 9-dan

Black: Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

date: 9th November, 1978

Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 1, 3, 5. Ishida's favourite opening with black.

White 26 is an excellent point, but the central influence White gains with the joseki to 32 is largely negated by Black 37. Perhaps White should have followed Dia. 1 with 32, placing less emphasis on the centre.

White 38, 40. The reason behind this precipi-






Figure 1 (1 – 50)

tate attack is presumably that Rin is not satisfied with his fuseki.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 2 (51 – 100)

65: takes two stones

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

White's attack does not gain him anything. Black cleverly retains sente up to 65, then seals White in with 69. White tries to create defects in Black's outside wall with 76 and 82 but to little avail. He finally has to come back and scramble for life with 84. Note that playing 84 at 1 in Dia. 2 would be a mistake, as Black would be left with the option of getting a seki with 2 to 6.

White 94. The focus of the game is now on whether White can make a sufficient reduction in Black's moyo at the bottom right. White 94 is very cautious. The other main possibility is to come right in, for example, with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'. If next Black 'd', White crosscuts at 'e', with reasonable chances of surviving.





Figure 3 (101 - 150)



Dia. 3

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Black 13 is Ishida's first misstep, as White can be killed with the sequence in Dia. 3. When White connects underneath with 14 and 16, he has almost caught up.

White 18. Too passive - reinforcing the centre




Figure 4 (151 - 200)




Figure 5 (201 - 243)

with 18 at 35 is more important. If Black hanes at 18, White plays 'a' and suffers only minor territorial damage.

Figure 4 (151 - 200)

The game is very close as the endgame begins, but White makes a mistake in the order of moves. Instead of 56, he should play White 61, Black 'a', White 73. Since Black would be left with a defect at 'b', he would have to defend at 81. Playing this way would probably have given White a narrow win. When Black plays 59, the outcome is decided.

Black wins by 3½ points.

Time taken. White: 5 hours 59 minutes

Black: 4 hours 32 minutes

Oza Title Match, Game One

This match was the first title series between Ishida and Kudo. So far the two had met only ten times in tournament play. Kudo lost the first six games but has won three of their four encounters in the last two years, so he did not face the challenger with any lack of confidence. His style is very similar to Ishida's: he prefers a slow-paced development and is deadly in the endgame. His reputation for accuracy in calculation and ability to assess the overall balance is second only to Ishida's.

White: Ishida Yoshio 9-dan

Black: Kudo Norio Oza

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

date: 21st November, 1978

Figure 1 (1 - 30). An unusual corner sequence

White 6 is a very leisurely move. Black 7 in




Figure 1 (1 - 30)

reply is a rather unusual pincer.

White 18. The continuation to 23 is forced. The question of whether White should play 24 and 26 is difficult, but these stones may be of some help if the white group later comes under attack.

The whole sequence to 27 in this corner has appeared before. Go Seigen assessed the result then as definitely favourable for Black. Ishida presumably disagrees. The consolation for White is that in this shape Black 13 ends up in a clumsy position, as it would work better at 'a'.

Black 29. If at 'b', White will attack at 'c'.

Figure 2 (31 - 41). *Shuko-style*

Black 31. This move was invented by Fujisawa Shuko in the 1st Tengen title match. The aim is to set up the atari at 35. If Black simply plays 31 at 32, White's stones on the side are unaffected, so he can invade to the right of 35.

White 36. If at 1 in Dia. 1, Black will play 2 and 4. The exchange of ▲ for 1 would be awful for White.

Dia. 2. This is a tewari analysis of the result to 38. Assume that White exchanges 1 for 2, then switches elsewhere. Black forces with 4 and 6. The position in the game is as if Black had thrown in a stone, making White capture at 'a'. The 'throw-in' is not necessarily bad for Black.

Dia. 3. If Black later connects at 1, then hanes at 3, he threatens to set up a ko with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'. In conclusion, Dias. 2 and 3 seem to provide sufficient justification for the odd-looking move at 31.

Black 39. A long-awaited attack. Defending at



The defender Kudo Norio 9-dan

Born 1940 in Hirosaki city, Aomori. Became a disciple of Maeda Nobuaki. Made shodan in 1955, 8-dan in 1969, 9-dan in 1976. A member of the 11th (1972), 1st (1976) and 3rd (1978) Meijin leagues and also of the 33rd (1978) and current Honinbo leagues. Won his first title last year by defeating Cho Chikun 2-0 in the Oza title.





Figure 2 (31 - 41)

38: connects



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Dia. 3

'a' would be steady but perhaps too slow.

White 40. Defending at 'b' (Black still plays 41) would make White too heavy.





Figure 3 (41 – 64)


Figure 3 (41 – 64). *Another novel corner exchange*

White 42. A natural attack, considering Black neglected to defend here.

Black 45. The peaceful combination of 1 and 3 in Dia. 4 might be preferable (if White 'a' after 3, Black is happy to extend to 'b'). Black 43 leads to complications.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

White 48 is a tesuji. Black cannot answer at 1 in Dia. 5 as White strikes at 2.

White 50. When White ignores Black's attempted forcing move at 49, the continuation to 61 is inevitable. Sakata commented that this was the first time that he had ever seen this shape. Ishida and Kudo agreed that the result to 63 was slightly favourable for White, but this is perhaps a psychological assessment. Black has not done badly territorially, but White has dictated the flow of the game.

Figure 4 (65 – 100). *White gains an edge.*

White 68. The strongest resistance to Black's placement at 67. This leads to the third unusual corner sequence.





Figure 4 (65 – 100)

Black 71. Connecting at 72, permitting White 'a', would be pointless. Black's group would not yet be alive.


Black 79. Connecting at 1 in Dia. 6 is also possible. White would counter with 2 to 6, forcing Black to defend at 7, whereupon he crosses underneath with 8.

White 82 is very big. In addition to taking points, it secures the two white groups and makes 90 and 92 sente.

When White secures his last unsettled group with 94 to 100, he seems to have a slight lead.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Figure 5 (101 – 152). *Black misses his chance.*

White 2—Black 3. These points are miai, but most people expected Ishida to play at 3 as it is worth more points.

White 4. After 98 and 100 in Figure 4 and 2 here the logical next step is to try and enclose the centre with 'a', but Ishida perhaps had doubts that this was enough to win. In any case, he switched to attack with 4.

White 6 is bad — this should be at 'b'.






Figure 5 (101 - 152)
48: connects



Dia. 8



Dia. 9

White 8 is also bad — pushing at 14 is correct.

Black 9. The losing move — Black throws away the opportunity to stage an upset presented by Ishida's two bad moves. If Black plays at 1 in Dia. 7, White has to play 2 and 4, so Black can attack the corner with 5 etc., forcing White to get a small life in gote. Black could then chase White out into the centre with 13 or just be satisfied with Black 'a', White connects, Black 'b'.

Dia. 8. If White counters with 2, Black gets a good result with 3 to 7. Either Dia. 7 or 8 would have given Black excellent chances of winning.


White 10 is an efficient move which eliminates the threat of Black 'b' in the Figure. It also creates the option of jumping in at 'c', so the fate of White 4 and 8 is no longer of crucial importance.

White easily escapes with 14 and 16. Black has to play 21 to negate the threat of White 30, so he ends in gote here. This result gives White a slight but definite lead.

Black 23 is a mistake in direction — correct

are 1 and 3 in Dia. 9. Since White is ahead, he will be reluctant to pick a fight with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' instead of 2. Dia. 9 would have made the game closer.

Black 31. Black can easily live with 1 to 5 in Dia. 10, but permitting White to play 2 and 4 in sente (with White 'a' to come) would be unbearable. Black therefore prefers to stake the fate of this group on a ko. However, he has no good ko threats, so this strategy is a failure and he has to flee ignominiously with 47 and 49.



Dia. 10




Figure 6 (153 - 218)
ko: 86, 89, 92

Figure 6 (153 - 218). Ishida takes the first game.

The moves in this figure do not affect the outcome — Black gets no opportunity to narrow the gap. He might even be behind on the board, so

finally he throws in the towel.

White wins by resignation after 218.

Time taken. White: 5 hours 9 minutes

Black: 5 hours 56 minutes

(Adapted from commentaries by Ishida and Kudo)

Game Two

White: Kudo Norio

Black: Ishida Yoshio

date: 4th December, 1978





Figure 1 (1 - 34)

Figure 1 (1 - 34). Black misses the key point.


Black 19 is the turning point of the fuseki. Since White 4 is on the 3-3 point, it does not have much potential for expansion along the side, so Black 19 is not urgent. The key move in this position is invading at 1 in Dia. 1. If White answers at 'a', Black can regard 1 as a forcing move and leave this corner till later. Kudo commented that he intended to answer at 2. After 3 to 7 -

Dia. 2. Black can settle his group with the sequence to 17, thus laying waste to White's main area.

Black 21 is too mild. If Black plays at 'a', White will answer at 25, so White could still invade at 1 in Dia. 1.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

White 22, 24. An excellent combination for White, defending the corner and weakening Black's group.


Black 25. Black is entitled to this attacking move since White omitted to play 'b' after Black 21. Defending on the left with Black 'c', however, seems to be necessary.

Black 27. Ishida regretted this move which is too concerned with immediate profit. The key point is defending at 'c', that is, at 1 in Dia. 3. This would permit White to attack at 3, leading to the standard sequence to 12, but Black gets compensation by limiting White's potential for expansion with 13 while further strengthening his group.

White 28 - 32. Pushing along the fifth line is frowned upon by the textbooks, but this sets up the severe attack at 34.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4





Figure 2 (35 - 62)



Dia. 5

Figure 2 (35 – 62). *Black comes under pressure.*

Black 39 shows fighting spirit. Simply pushing up at 1 in Dia. 4 is too mild, as it would only help White to defend the top with 2 and 4. After 39 in the figure, the continuation to 51 is inevitable.

The result to 56 is favourable for White. Black's group on the side is still unsettled, as White can attack its eye-shape with 'a'.

Black 61 is a turning point in the middle game. The usual move would be at 1 in Dia. 5, but this does not seem good enough to win. Just playing the sequence to 10 would put White ahead in territory. In view of this, Sakata 9-dan suggested playing 1 at 'a', which would pick up extra points if White played the same sequence to 10. In this case, however, White would be bound to come in on the right.

Ishida played 61 because of dissatisfaction with 1 in Dia. 5, but Kudo promptly struck another severe blow with 62.

Figure 3 (63 – 83). *Black takes it too easy.*

Black 63. The simplest answer to White's attack would be Black 1 etc. in Dia. 6, but this lets White get away too easily; it would only be appropriate in a handicap game.

White 70. White is aiming at the cutting point




Figure 3 (63 – 83)


at 'a'.

Black 75. Making an all-out attempt to catch White with 1 etc. in Dia. 7 would be unlikely to succeed, as there are too many defects in Black's own position.


Black 81. Black should omit the 77 to 80 exchange and continue the attack with 1 in Dia. 8. Black has to think about the possibility of White counterattacking with 2 and 4, but he can defend with 9 after playing 5 and 7. Instead of 2 –

Dia. 9. Kudo commented that he intended to answer Black 1 with 2 etc., leaving White 'a' for later. This sequence gives Black a better result than he gets in the game, confirmation that Black 1 is the key point. Once White plays there, with 82 in the figure, his group is beyond attack and Black has little hope of winning.


With 83 Black launches an attack on White's last weak group. However, this attack would be much more effective if White's centre group were still unsettled.




Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 9





Figure 4 (83 - 112)



Dia. 10

Dia. 11

Dia. 12

Figure 4 (83 - 112). *Black's do-or-die challenge*

Black 83. Black could also attack with 1 in Dia. 10. If White 2 at 6, Black plays in at 2; if White 'a', Black 6. Kudo therefore intended to answer at 2. If Black 3, White lives with 2 to 6.


White 84. White 2 in Dia. 11 is unreasonable — White has no answer to Black 7.

Black 87. Black 1 in Dia. 12 is bad, as White lives while taking profit with 2 to 6. Black's pon-nuki has no effect on White's centre group.

Black 107, 109. A desperation measure — Black is behind by at least the komi.

White 110 is a mistake — Black cannot live if White attaches at 1 in Dia. 13. After the forced sequence to 7, Black can play 8 to 14, but White 15 stops him in his tracks.

White 112. White defends his main weak point. He is prepared to let Black get a ko in the corner, as he has innumerable threats against Black's



Dia. 13

group on the centre left, while 112 is a big move in itself.






Figure 5 (113 - 156)

ko: 23, 26, 29, 36, 39, 42, 45, 50, 53



Dia. 14




Dia. 15

Figure 5 (113 - 156). *A bloody conclusion*

Black 13. This is a complicated corner position. The players following the game expected Black to set up a ko with 1 in Dia. 14. They were astonished by Black 13, as it creates a well-known 'dead shape', the usual killing sequence being White 14, Black 27, White 28. However, the outside position makes a difference and after 15 and 17 Ishida played the magnificent tesuji of 19.

White 20. If White 1 in Dia. 15, Black easily lives with 2 to 6.

Dia. 16. If White tries to kill Black with 1, Black gets an extra eye with 6 to 10.



Dia. 16

White cannot stop Black from getting a ko with 21 and 23. This ko is much better for Black than the ko in Dia. 14. Ironically, however, Kudo was certain of victory at this stage, as Black could not expect both to win the ko and to save his group on the centre left.

White 46 kills the large group. Black 47 is an oversight, as it should be at 48, but that would make little difference. White should still be able to kill Black with the sequence in Dias. 17 and 18.





Figure 1 (1 - 25)

This decisive win for Kudo took the Oza title match back to the starting point and kept alive his hopes of defending the title.

White wins by resignation after 156.

Time taken. White: 5 hours 43 minutes

Black: 5 hours 32 minutes

(From commentaries by Kudo and Ishida)

Game Three

White: Ishida Yoshio

Black: Kudo Norio

date: 11th December, 1978

Figure 1 (1 - 25). A fuseki problem point

White 6. Ishida considers this larger than the usual splitting move at A.

White 24 seems natural to prevent Black from blocking at 'a', but defending the top seems more urgent. The sequence White 'b'—Black 'c'—White 'd' would work well in conjunction with White 20. If next Black 'a', White could attach at 'e'; if instead Black 'f', White then plays 24.

Black 25. The only move — this enables Black to take the initiative.

Figure 2 (26 - 38). White switches ground.

White 26. Attaching at 1 in Dia. 1 does not work well. Black hollows out White's top area with 2 to 8, then connects underneath with 10 and 12. This would mean a sure loss for White.





Figure 2 (26 - 38)

Making an exchange of territory by invading at 26 is the best response.

Black 37 is solid. Defending indirectly, for example, with Black 'a', would just leave a weak point for White to aim at later.

White 38. White must defend somehow against Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.



Dia. 1




Figure 3 (39 - 85)

Figure 3 (39 - 85). Black's error in strategy

Black 39. Playing in at 40 is also possible, but Black is satisfied with the straightforward sequence to 45. As compensation for his territorial loss, White builds thickness in order to counter the influence of Black's moyo on the right side.

Black 47 is a slack move which lets slip the advantage Black has gained in the fuseki. Kudo was worried about the possibility of a white attack at 'a', but even if he lost his base here, he could easily lead his stones out to the centre. Two alternatives seem more urgent than Black 47. Defending the right side with Black 58 would secure a forty-point territory and simplify the game for Black. Just as good would be making a checking extension (tsume) at the bottom at 59. This would give White the hard problem of deciding where to attack Black's moyo, while Black could be confident of getting a large territory either on the right or at the bottom.

White 48. When Ishida attached here, he felt that the game had become even. The result in this corner is satisfactory for White, but he has trouble deciding whether to play 58 or 61. White 61 would give better access to the centre, but the advantage of 58 is that White can aim at attacking at 65.

White 60 is reckless - this is just an invitation to Black to make a splitting attack. Playing 60 at 'b' would have been good enough. White is in trouble when Black attacks with 61.

Black 77. This is a resolute sacrifice. The forcing move of 81 sets up the severe two-step hane

of 87 and 89 in the next figure.

Black 85 is the key point for attacking White.





Figure 4 (86 - 126)


Figure 4 (86 - 126). Kudo throws the game away.

Black 91. When Kudo cut here, Ishida was resigned to losing one of his groups.

Black 101. The losing move. Black should extend at 1 in Dia. 2. White 2 is the best answer, but connecting at 5 affects both the white groups. If White defends the larger one with 6, Black kills the group at the bottom with 7. White therefore



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


cannot afford to connect at 6. Instead —

Dia. 3. Making life at the bottom with 1 is best, though this lets Black attack with 2 and 4. White can live with 5 to 9, but capturing three stones in sente would give Black a win. If White plays 7 at 8, Black starts a ko by cutting at 7, but this would be hopeless for White.

Black 103. Kudo apparently overlooked White's answer at 104. White now lives with 106 and 108 and capturing the three stones with 111 becomes gote for Black. When White switches to the large point of 112 in the centre, he has taken over the lead.

Black 117. This should be at 118 if Black wants to fight on. However, White would play 'a' and win easily.

Black 121. The centre stones could also be saved by playing at 1 in *Dia. 4*, but White squeezes in sente, then switches to 14 and 16 (if Black 15 at 16, White cuts at 'a'). This result would make the game close on the board, regardless of the komi.



Dia. 4

Kudo was so upset by his oversight with 101 and 103 that he lost all fighting spirit. The moves after that were just played to set the scene for resignation. It must have been a bitter blow, to have two groups virtually at one's mercy, then to see them both escape unscathed.

White wins by resignation after 126.

Time taken. White: 5 hours 31 minutes

Black: 5 hours 25 minutes

(From 'Kido', February 1978)

4th Tengen Title

The 4th Tengen title match provided the most dramatic clash so far in the history of this new title, with two of the top title-holders, Kisei and Honinbo, matched against each other. Appropriately enough for the last title match of the year, it featured a restaging of the epic Kisei clash between Fujisawa Shuko and Kato Masao that started the tournament year. Both players were brimful of confidence before the match. Shuko, who defeated Cho Chikun, Hisai 9-dan and Hane 8-dan in the final section of the knockout tournament, announced: 'I don't care if my opponent's Kato or who it is, I'll crush him three straight.' For his part, Kato, who had fought his way to the final past Sugiuchi 9-dan, Ohira and Kobayashi Koichi, simply declared his intention of 'repaying the Kisei debt'.

Game One

White: Fujisawa Shuko, Kisei

Black: Kato Masao, Honinbo & Judan

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

date: 8th November, 1978

Figure 1 (1 – 21). *An unusual fuseki*

Black 1 – White 4. Both sides have played




Figure 1 (1 – 21)

mukaikomoku (3–4 point stones facing each other), an unusual fuseki pattern. Ohira 9-dan, the referee for this game, commented that it was the first time that he had ever seen it.

Black 21 is an excellent move, being both an extension and an attack on White 12. Perhaps White should have played 16 at 'a'.





Figure 2 (22 - 47)

Figure 2 (22 - 47). *Both sides invade.*

White 28. Not White 'a', as Black makes good shape with 'b'.

White 32, 34. A good combination. If White does nothing here, Black 36 would be severe.

Black 35. Giving atari at 1 in Dia. 1 is crude; setting up a ladder with 2 and 4 is good for White. If Black simply extends at 3 instead of 1, then White 2, Black 'a', White 'b' follow and now White threatens to attack the black group on the right.



Dia. 1

White 38. Staking out a high position like this is typical of Shuko.

Black 41 and 43 are well-timed: Black takes profit while also eating away at White's base.

White 44. White was aiming at this invasion when he played 40. He would fall behind if he used 44 to defend the top (at 47, for example).

Figure 3 (48 - 72). *To err is human but Kato is forgiven.*

White 48. The sequence White 67-Black 'a'-White 70 would be 'usual' but perhaps not interesting enough for Shuko.






Figure 3 (48 - 72)

White 58 met with much criticism as a crude move untypical of Shuko. White should simply connect at 1 in Dia. 2. If Black 2, White extends at 3 in sente, then cuts at 5, capturing the five stones. White loses sente this way, but the difference it makes to the top is worth it. He can squeeze Black in the corner with 'a', Black 'b', White 'c' etc., reducing Black's top by about ten points compared to the game.

Black, however, returned the compliment by going wrong himself with 63. This move looks like good style, but actually the blunt atari at 1 in



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 3 is preferable. Black keeps sente and so can switch to the key point of 5 (White 'a' and Black 'b' would follow). This way White would hardly get a chance to move out with the Δ stone.

Both sides made mistakes in the fighting at the top, but Black's slack move was not so reprehensible as White's faux pas with 58. The result to 69 puts Black in the lead.

White 72 aims at the ko with White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', but for the moment Black has too many ko threats.





Figure 4 (73 - 113)

Figure 4 (73 - 113). *White catches up.*


Black 73 lacks severity, according to Kato – attacking with 1 in Dia. 4 would be more interesting. If White 2, Black defends the side with 3 and 5. If White plays 'a' instead of 2, Black counters with the two-step hane of 'b'; if White 2 at 3, Black pulls back at 'c'. These variations are all better than the sequence played in the game.

White takes instant advantage of Black's slack move by striking with 74 and 76. He is able to break up Black's left side in sente up to 80, then he continues with the nice attacking move at 82. White 'a' is sente, so Black cannot play 'b'. Note that Black is reluctant to make the primitive connection of 'c' with 83, as White would keep up the pressure with White 85. Both sides make good shape in the instructive exchange to 86.


Black 87. The only move, according to Kato. It both eliminates the threat of ko and also aims at attacking the white group.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

White 88–92. Although the exchange on the left side was favourable for White, he is still behind in territory, so he must try to complicate the position. He hopes to be able to strengthen his own weak group at the top by attacking Black's centre group.


Black 101. Black 110 would be worth about twenty points, but Black decides that playing in the centre is more urgent. His aim with 101 is to take the initiative by attacking first.

Black 103. After the game Shuko suggested that Kato should have played 103 at 1 in Dia. 5. White cannot answer at 2, as Black can take away his eye-shape with the tesuji of 3 to 7. Therefore—

Dia. 6. White has to answer at 2, submitting to Black's attack with 3 to 9. However, it is humiliating for White to eke out life with 'a'.

White 110. White should reinforce his group at the top, but he will fall too far behind if Black plays 110. Capturing two stones with 110 and 112 is bigger than it looks, as White now threatens to attack Black with sequence in Dia. 7.

White has more or less caught up in territory now, but he has left his group at the top to fend for itself. Can it be saved when Black strikes at 113?



Dia. 7





Figure 5 (114 - 148)

Figure 5 (114 - 148). Black misses his chance.

Black 15. A tough move which Shuko apparently overlooked. If White answers at 'a', Black starts what would be a nasty ko with 18.


Black 21. Kato could have finished off the game here, but because he felt that he was ahead in territory anyway, he relaxed a little, failing to look for the severest follow-up to 15. Instead of 21, giving atari at 1 in Dia. 8 is the strongest move. If White 2, Black defends at 3, then White has to resort to an unfavourable ko with 4 to try to save his group. Instead of 2 -

Dia. 9. Making an eye in the corner with 2 to 8



Dia. 8

Dia. 10



Black 51. Black can be forgiven for thinking that this endgame move is sente, as if White omits 56, Black can reduce him to one eye with Black 72, White 71, Black 'a', White 56, Black 'b'. However, White surprises Black with the brilliant move of 52 which reinforces his centre stones while also offering assistance to his group at the top. At this point White seems to have staged an upset.





Figure 7 (201 - 252)

Figure 7 (201 - 252). Shuko's tenacity

White 4. Shuko thought for one hour one minute about this connection. One may wonder why so much time was needed for such an ordinary-looking move, but actually Shuko was calculating whether it was necessary for him to play the



Dia. 10

ko with 2 etc. in Dia. 10. White has more ko threats, so he should win it, but Shuko concluded that just by connecting at 4 he was certain of winning by half a point anyway, so he chose not to take the risk. Nevertheless, his dogged analysis here epitomises the tenacity that enabled him to win this game.

The game finally ended at 9. 31 p.m. Kato must have been quite upset by his defeat, as he missed chance after chance to finish off his opponent. Ohira 9-dan commented that if he had not slackened off in the latter part of the game, it would have been a 'Kato masterpiece'.

White wins by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

Time taken. White: 5 hours 21 minutes

Black: 5 hours 27 minutes

(Based on a commentary by Kato in 'Kido' Feb. 1979)

Game Two

White: Kato Masao

Black: Fujisawa Shuko

date: 22nd November, 1979




Figure 1 (1 - 23)


Figure 1 (1 - 23). Kato's heavy move

Black 13, preventing White from getting a base here, has become popular in the Chinese-style fuseki recently. White answers by dodging lightly to 14.


White 16 is another light move. White could push up with 1 etc. in Dia. 1, but this gives him a heavy group inviting attack.

White 20 is a bad move which makes White too heavy. Preferable is White 1 in Dia. 2. If Black 2, White makes good shape with 3 and 5 and is almost immune to attack.

Black 23. Peacefully defending with 'a' is also good enough.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 2 (24 – 56)

Figure 2 (24 – 56). Kato is hard pressed.

The sequence from 24 is forced.


White 36 is too thin: Black immediately attacks with 37, forcing White to defend with 38. The shoulder-hit of 1 in Dia. 3 seems preferable to 36. White is virtually alive after the sequence to 7. If Black counterattacks with 2 at 'a', White can cope by replying with 'b'.

Black takes control of the game with his attack from 39 to 45: he is playing in the centre while White is occupying worthless dame points.


Black 47 is the vital point – White should have played there himself with 46. Black 47 not only aims at wedging in at 'a' but also nips in the bud a threatened attack. White had been waiting for a chance to cut with White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e', White 'f', but the presence of 47 means that Black could then capture White with Black 'g', White 'h', Black 'i'.

White 54. White really should answer at 'j', but he got sick of being pushed around.


Black 55. Shuko spent one hour fourteen




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

minutes on this move. Among the possibilities he considered are Dias. 4 to 6.

Dia. 4. Black intercepts with 5 after forcing with 1 and 3. However, White counters with 6 etc. and should be able to live.

Dia. 5. The hane at 1 is natural, but the result to 4 is disappointing for Black as White gets a solid shape.

Dia. 6. After the game the players concluded that Black 1 here is best. White secures his group with 2 and 4, then defends at 6. However, Black gets sente to play 7, while 1 defends against White 'a'.

White 56. For better or for worse, White must play boldly.

Figure 3 (57 – 100). Shuko's fatal omission

Black 61. This attack enables Black to connect underneath with 65 and 67, but in the opinion of a number of the players following the game, Black's gain here is trivial. They considered Black 68, forcing White 'a', followed by Black 69, as more urgent. White would have no severe attack on the top right black group.

Black 79. Shuko regretted this move as it permitted Kato the capping move at 80. Much safer for Black would be playing at 1 in Dia. 7. If White 2, Black 3 would secure the group. Even simply playing Black 1 at 'a' would be good enough.

White 80 is an excellent attacking move. For the first time Kato felt that he might have an




Figure 3 (57 - 100)






Figure 4 (101 - 134)

8: connects



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

outside chance of winning.


Black 91. Shuko also bitterly regretted that he did not make the peep at 1 in Dia. 8 before living with 3. This would have given Black an easy win as it eliminates the threat of White 4 (Black captures the cutting stones with 7 to 11). Shuko hesitated to play 1 since there was also a peep at 'a', but this omission was very costly.

Figure 4 (101 - 134). Anticlimax

Black squeezes with 1 to 7, then lives with 9, but he cannot be proud of this result. The threat of Black 'a' means that White cannot connect at 'b', but White 'c' is now sente. This in turn gives White the endgame move of 'd', forcing Black 'e', so Black pays a price for living. The game is now very close.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10
8: above 1
9: at 4

Black 15 is inexplicable — Black could have lived by attaching at 1 in Dia. 9. If White 2 at 4, Black plays 2 and has no trouble in living, so White plays 2 and 4. However, Black still saves himself with 5 to 9. In case of emergency, Black 'a' is sente, so Black has an eye in reserve over here.

Once Black plays 15, the continuation is forced. The game is over when White cuts with 22 and 24.

Black has no answer to 34. If 1 in Dia. 10, White wins with the standard sequence to 10.

Shuko commented that he lost this game because he spent too much time on Black 55 in Figure 2. Presumably he meant that he used up all his energy here, so the quality of his play fell off thereafter. Another reason for his loss could be that he was so upset by White's cut at 102 that he became pessimistic about this position. If he had realised that he was still leading, he might have played more calmly on the top left.

This time Shuko dropped what had been a good game for him, so the result was the reverse of the

first game. Perhaps this was poetic justice.

White wins by resignation after 134.

Time taken. White: 5 hours 32 minutes

Black: 4 hours 59 minutes

(From commentaries in the Feb. '79 'Kido' and Jan. 'Igo' 'Club')

Game Three

White: Fujisawa Shuko

Black: Kato Masao

date: 29th November, 1979




Figure 1 (1 - 42)

Figure 1 (1 - 42). *White misses a forcing move.*


Black 1 - White 6. The pattern on the right is the latest fuseki fad.

White 10. White cannot permit Black 'a'.


Black 27. Black 1 in Dia. 1 would be more consistent with the contact play at 23. Black 3 and 5 would also help Black's moyo at the bottom.

Black 31. Black 1 in Dia. 2 would now be too late, as White would counter with 2, making miai of 'a' and 4.


White 32. Connecting these two groups gives White a satisfactory fuseki.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Black 33. The only move now that the fuseki stage is just about completed. Black 37, making 41 possible, is correct in this position.

White 42 defends the weak point at 'b'. However, Shuko regretted not first exchanging White 'c' for Black 'd'. If he had done so, he would have been able to answer Black 47 in the next figure by making good shape with White 'e'. Playing the forcing move of 'c' would have given White the edge over Black.




Figure 2 (43 - 100)

66: connects

Figure 2 (43 - 100). *The losing move*

Black 47 - 51. A nice flow of moves for Black, which is why missing the forcing move of 'c' in Figure 1 was unfortunate. To avoid this result, using 48 to attach at 1 in Dia. 3 is conceivable. This would start a fight as Black would answer aggressively by cutting with 2 and 4. The result to 13 seems reasonable for both.

White 58. Resisting with 1 in Dia. 4 would be suicidal. The sequence to 14 sets up a ladder at 'a'.


Black 59, 61. The correct order. If Black plays 61 first, the continuation White 68, Black 60, White 59, Black 71, White 'a' is bad for Black.

White 62. If at 71, the sequence Black 62, White 65, Black 'b' gives Black ideal shape. White therefore has to let Black squeeze with 63 and 65.

White 70. White does not have enough threats to play a ko at 71. The result so far is acceptable for White, as he has built central thickness and made a sufficient reduction of Black's top area.

White 72. The losing move. This was the first move the players looked at after Shuko resigned. White 72 is terribly slack, for when Black plays 73, White has to defend at 74, giving him a heavy, over-concentrated shape. Instead of 72 —

Dia. 5. White 1 is the only move. Black has no good answer, so he would switch to 75 in the figure. If Black 2 at 3, White is glad to extend to 'a'; Black could link up with his group on the right with Black 'b', White 'c', but this gains nothing as White is left with 'd'. Playing nothing here thus seems to be best for Black, but then White plays 3, forcing Black to defend his group with 4, then jumps in at 5. This whole sequence makes a big difference to Black's top area and would have made the game difficult for him.




Dia. 5 2: elsewhere


Black 79 is a clever peep. If White connects, it serves as a useful forcing move for building up Black's moyo; if White counterattacks with 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black hits him with 2 to 6. If White 5 at 'a', Black 'b'; if 5 at 6, then Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c'.

White 82. If at 1 in *Dia. 7*, White can live easily, but Black builds up impressive thickness in the centre. After 23 he would switch to 'c' in the figure and easily keep his lead.


White 86 shows a strange lack of fighting spirit coming after 82 and 84, as the usual meaning of these moves would be to set up a ko with White 99, Black 98, White 'd'.



Dia. 6



Dia. 8



Dia. 7

Black 89. An excellent move which helps Black to solidify his territory.

Figure 3 (101 – 155). *A one-sided game*

White 2 is necessary. If White does nothing here, Black kills him with the combination of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8*.

The result to 15 simplifies the game for Black, as 5 and 7 strengthen his group at the bottom while 9 to 15 cancel out White's thickness at the top.

Black 17, the move Black was aiming at with 79 in Figure 2, is the coup de grace. White forces once with 18, but then has to give way with 20




Figure 3 (101 – 155)

and 22. The strongest resistance would be White 'a', Black 'b', White 23, but then White has no answer to Black 'c', White 'd', Black 'e'.

White picks up some points in the centre by attacking with 28 etc., but this hardly compensates for his loss on the left side.

Black 49. If at 51, White still connects underneath with White 49, Black 'f', White 52.

This was a rather one-sided game as Shuko's play showed little of his usual flair and tenacity. In particular, his slack move at 72 deprived him of any real chance of winning. When he resigned, Black was nearly twenty points ahead on the board.

White resigns after 155.

Time taken. White: 3 hours 6 minutes

Black: 3 hours 10 minutes

(Based on a commentary by Kato in 'Kido', Jan. 1979)

Game Four

White: Kato Masao

Black: Fujisawa Shuko

date: 13th December, 1978




Figure 1 (1 - 37)

Figure 1 (1 - 37). A tried and trusted fuseki

Black 5. Shuko has been saying recently that he is going to stop playing the Chinese-style fuseki so much, but when he is in trouble he always seems to revert to his favourite pattern.

White 6 is rarely seen these days. The approach move at 'a', as in the second game, is usual.

Black 13. Black 'b' would make good shape on the left, but building up the right side with 13 fits in with the moyo strategy of the Chinese-style fuseki, though it permits White to take some early

profit with 14.

Black 19 is correct shape. If Black plays 34 instead, White attacks with 'c', Black 35, White 'd', making Black's group heavy.

Black 23. The only move. Defending the corner with Black 30 would let White eat away at the side with 'e'.

Black 37. Black 'f' is another large point. Kato expected Shuko to play in the centre at 'g' or 'h'.




Figure 2 (38 - 67)

Figure 2 (38 - 67). Focus on the corner

White 38 is aggressive. Black's group is in little immediate danger; the question is how large a part White 38 plays in the game later on.


Black 41. If at 'a', White attacks at 'b'.

White 42. White moves into Black's moyo in a very leisurely fashion with 42 to 46. He is leaving Black's group on the left alone for the time being, but he is aiming at attacking at 'c' later on.


Black 49 is a solid move. Kato commented that he would have found Black 'd' more disagreeable, as he was grateful for the chance to play 50.

White 52 is the toughest counter to Black's probe at 51. Black perhaps expected White 1 in Dia. 1. After forcing with 2 and 4, Black attaches at 6; if White counters with 8, Black crosscuts at 7, so White would have to pull back docilely at 7. This would be an interesting result for Black.


Black 61. Attacking at 1 in Dia. 2 is also possible. White will capture at 2, so Black can move out with 3 and 5. However, after 6, White threatens to make attacks on both black groups, while he is also left with 'a'.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Black 65. If at 2 in Dia. 3, White gets a one-sided ko with 3 to 9 in which he stands to lose almost nothing. When Black plays 65 –

Dia. 4. White can still get a ko, but this time he suffers considerable damage if he loses it. In addition, Black has a ko threat at 'a'. White would have to think twice about initiating this ko.

Dia. 5. Note that the hane at 1 does not work. Black gets a seki with 2 to 8.



Dia. 5

Figure 3 (68 – 100). Problems in settling a group

White 68. White is clearly behind in territory, so he has to try and redress the balance by attacking Black. Note that Black is reluctant to play through at 89, as this would not only help White to secure the top but might also give him an opportunity to initiate the ko in the top left corner.

Black 73, 79. Kato considers that these moves could well be the losing moves, as after this Black




Figure 3 (68 – 100)

has no real chance to win, at least in his opinion.


Black 73. Black 1 in Dia. 6 is correct, according to Kato. Black would have an easier time settling his group with this move and could also aim at 'a'.

Black 79. Kato recommends 1 and 3 in Dia. 7 instead. White 4 is the strongest answer, but Black gets one eye in sente with 5 to 13, then lives with 15. This result makes a great difference to White's bottom area. If White 4 at 5, Black can answer at 'a'. White does not have a chance to play 15 himself during this sequence, as Black would just sacrifice the six stones to the left. Even if cut off, these stones would still be potentially dangerous.


Black must answer 80 at 81, so White gets the chance to defend the bottom with 82. This is his first major gain from the attack.

Black 89 – 90. A bad exchange for Black. When White later plays 98, the effect of Black's cut at 83 is negated.

White 94. Just in case Black is thinking of playing 'a' to eliminate the ko potential of Dia. 4.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7




Figure 4 (101 - 140)

Figure 4 (101 - 140). *Plundering Black's treasure-house*


Black 3. The top left corner now proves to be a burden to Black, for he cannot leave the ko aji there indefinitely. Moving out into White's potential area at the top is more efficient than adding a stone in the corner.

White 4. We now see why Kato made the forcing move at 66 in Figure 2 and why originally he was satisfied with the mild-looking moves of 42 to 46. Black is unable to offer any resistance to 4, so his prime territory is ravaged. For example –


Dia. 8. If Black counters with 1, White plays 2 and 4. The ko with Black 6 – White 5 is favourable for White, but if Black tries to kill White with 5 to 9, White counters with 12 to 16, breaking up Black's territory (note that 13 is forced because of the threat of White 'a').

Dia. 9. There is little difference if Black extends on the second line at 1 instead. After 2 to 8, White threatens to play 'a' for the same result.


Black 17. If at 18, White is happy to sacrifice



Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

his four stones with 'a' etc. Black seals White in with 17 and 19, but White is untroubled. A large exchange takes place in the sequence to 30. Note that Black 21 is a good move – simply extending at 'b' would be too slow.

Kato was convinced that this result made the game favourable for him, but actually it was still extremely close.

White 32. 'Less is more': if White is greedy and attaches at 1 in Dia. 10, Black hits him with the double punch of 2 and 4. If White 5, Black sets up a nasty ko with 6 to 14. If White 5 at 'a', Black counters with 'b'.

Figure 5 (141 - 170). *A close game*

White 44. Too small. Kato commented that he should have given atari at 'a', as Black could not have fought a ko.

White 52 is another slip, as White 'b' would gain a full point. Black could play 'c', forcing White 52, but Black 'd' would no longer be sente.

Kato had relaxed after his successful assault on Black's right-side territory, but when Black played 59 he suddenly realised that his conviction that he was ahead might be mistaken. On recounting, he




Figure 5 (141 - 170)





Figure 6 (171 - 228)

realised with a jolt that due to his slack play the game had become very close, a half point either way.

Figure 6 (171 - 228). Kato pulls it off.

Black 95 is a clever move. If White captures at 1 in Dia. 11, Black counters with 2 etc., forcing White to live in gote.

Black 99 is a problem point. After the game



Dia. 11

Shuko suggested that he might have won by half a point if he had played at 105 instead and at the time Kato agreed. However, further examination showed that White would still have won by half a point by playing 100 at 115 (Black defends to the right of 115, so White captures a stone with 117).

This win not only made up for Shuko's half point win in the first game but also gave Kato his revenge for his fateful half point loss in the final Kisei title game at the beginning of the year. Shuko and Kato are great rivals across the Go board and the best of friends away from it — it seems fitting that the 1978 tournament year began and ended with dramatic clashes between the two.

White wins by half a point.

Time taken. White: 4 hours 56 minutes

Black: 5 hours 57 minutes

(Based on a commentary by Kato in 'Kido', Feb. 1978)



The moment of victory. Taking a keen interest is Kajiware 9-dan (sitting, extreme left)

James Kerwin's Kisei Success

We will be presenting a comprehensive report on all stages of the 3rd Kisei tournament in our next issue, but in the meantime we would like to show the reader two games from the 4th Kisei tournament. If the chronology seems confused, our only excuse is that it seems appropriate to present these games, the first significant success by a Westerner in a Japanese newspaper tournament, as early as possible. Actually, we do have a second excuse, for the Kisei tournament is such a large-scale affair that the first stage of one tournament is well under way before the third stage of the previous tournament has even begun.

James Kerwin, who will be thirty-three in November this year, has now been playing as a shodan at the Nihon Ki-in for nearly a year after just over three years experience in the insei league. He may have been disappointed with his first year of play in the oteai, in which he scored three wins to nine losses, but for a Westerner who learnt Go at the age of 17, this seems quite a creditable result, matched as he was against opponents who had been playing Go since elementary school. Be that as it may, he more than redeemed himself in the 1-dan section of the 4th Kisei tournament. With successive wins against Sakuramoto Saburo (14½ points), Inoue Machiko (by resignation), Sano Kuniko (by resig.), he won his way to the final. Here he was matched against Nakamura Kuniko, a fellow disciple of Iwamoto 9-dan. Kerwin gained a comfortable win by 10½ points and his success has received considerable publicity in the Japanese Go press.

Kerwin v. Inoue

White: James Kerwin 1-dan

Black: Inoue Machiko 1-dan

komi: 5½; time: 6 hours each

date 20th December, 1978

Figure 1 (1 – 35)

Black 15 is inconsistent with 13 – it should be at 25 or 'a'. When White invades at 16, Black has to choose between two evils: blocking at 18, which would make 15 meaningless, or blocking at 17 which makes 13 meaningless. White is happy with the sequence to 26 as he has a good follow-up move on the side at 'b'.

Black 29 should be at 32, building up Black's moyo at the bottom. However, Black does not want to give White the good sequence of White 'c', Black 'd', White 29, Black 'e', White 'f', which would make Black over-concentrated at the top.

Black 35. The vital point for attacking White's base. White has come out ahead in the fuseki, so Black hopes to recoup by attacking this group.




Figure 1 (1 – 35)





Figure 2 (36 – 65)

Figure 2 (36 – 65)

Black 37 is too passive. Considering that Black is behind, she should try to complicate the position by counterattacking with 1 in Dia. 1, taking



advantage of the favourable ladder. White has to switch to 4, permitting Black to extend at 5. All the same, White does not appear to be in much trouble after 6 and 8 (or 'a').

White 42. White 48 would make better shape.

Black 43 is the losing move – permitting White 44 loses Black a minimum of ten points. The only move for Black is making a hane at 44, then connecting. Black 43 would only be permissible if it killed the white group. However, White has little trouble escaping with 46 to 54.




Figure 3 (66 – 100)

Figure 3 (66 – 100)

Black 69. Peeping at 'a' would be the best way to start operations in this area.

White 70. White should answer at 'b' in order not to give Black a second forcing move. If Black continued at 71 regardless, White could capture her with 96.

Black 73. A desperation move but clearly unreasonable. Black should simply play the forcing move of 1 in Dia. 2, giving up her two stones. Black 1 would both limit White's potential ex-





Figure 4 (101 – 142)



Dia. 3

pansion and build up Black's own moyo.

Black is trapped after White 80. She manages to set up a capturing race (semeai) only to end up one move behind.

Figure 4 (101 – 142)

Black launches a last desperate attack on White's bottom group. She cuts it off by main force with 19 etc., but this attack is also unreasonable. White delivers the coup de grace with 34. Black plays a few more moves, then throws in the towel.

Dia. 3. If Black resists White 34 with 1 here, White counters with the tesuji of 2, crushing all resistance.

This convincing win over Inoue Machiko was a good indication that Kerwin had realistic prospects of taking the 1-dan championship, as Inoue had been the 1-dan winner in both the 2nd and 3rd Kisei tournaments.

Black resigns after White 142.

James Kerwin made a good start to the new year with his third win, on the 10th January. His opponent was Sano Kuniko, a seventeen year old

Osaka player who turned professional after winning the Japanese women's championship in 1974. This got him into the final, in which he was matched against Nakamura Kuniko, a fellow disciple of Iwamoto Kaoru 9-dan.

Kerwin v. Nakamura

White: James Kerwin

Black: Nakamura Kuniko

date: 17th January, 1979




Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Figure 1 (1 - 50)

Black 13. Pressing at 23 would be better.

White 22. This ladder-block is not severe enough. White should attach at 'a'; if then Black 23, White continues with 'b'.


Black 25. Attaching at 1 in Dia. 1 would give Black a quicker development. White 'a' is too mild, so White plays in at 2 and the sequence to 8 follows (8 could also be at 'b' or 'c').

White 26. White should switch to 'c', the best point on the board. White 'c' would effectively negate Black's thickness on the bottom left.


White 30 is aggressive; since White is leading in the fuseki, simply crawling on the third line would be good enough.

Black 37 is bad shape: preferable would be playing 1 to 5 in Dia. 2. Instead of 1 -


Dia. 3. Playing immediately at 1 is also possible. This plan was suggested by Sakata Eio 9-dan. White will play 2 to 6, whereupon Sakata's idea is to strike at 7. Resisting with 8 is bad for White as Black can force with 9 to 15, just about securing




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

life for her group. White 16 is necessary, so Black could switch to 17. This result is terrible for White, so -

Dia. 4. He would have to compromise with 8 and 10. After these forcing moves, however, Black's stones on top are light.

White 42 is an excellent point.

Black 45 is the losing move - this must be at 50, even though White could make a peep at 45.

Figure 2 (51 - 100)

White 52 is an excellent attacking move which destroys Black's shape.

Black 53. Playing at Black 'a' would be better, though Black would still lose her pivotal stones




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

in the continuation White 56, Black 54, White 74. Note that Sakata's move in Dia. 3, though it still exists, is now gote.

White 76 is too submissive — playing White 'b' in the centre, forestalling Black 77, would increase White's lead even if Black takes the bottom left corner.




Figure 3 (101 - 160)
ko: 39, 42, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, 60

Figure 3 (101 - 160)

Black 17. Black is so far behind that she cannot win if she docilely answers White's 'sente' move, but she is unable to close the gap in this ko fight.


Figure 4 (161 - 228)

Black 77. Black has no choice — if at 1 in Dia. 5, White can attach at 2. If Black resists with 3, White plays 4 and 6, forcing Black 7, then strikes with the tesuji of 8. This is unanswerable.

There is little else to comment on in the endgame. Black's missteps in the early middle game were so serious that it proved impossible to recover from them.

White wins by 10½ points.

(Based on an oral commentary by Kerwin)



Dia. 5




Figure 4 (161 - 228)
66: ko; 68: connects; 69: ko; 71: connects ko;
125: at 98; 126: at 78; 128: takes ko
White wins and connects the ko

A financial footnote. Even at this level, the first rung on the gigantic Kisei ladder, the prize-money is not to be sneezed at and probably compares favourably with a lot of the chess tournaments around. For each game he played, Kerwin received a fee of ¥30,000, while the prize for winning the 1-dan section was ¥200,000. In addition, he gained a place in the second stage of the tournament, a knockout tournament among the winners of the individual dan sections, and for his first game, against the 2-dan winner, will receive a fee of ¥100,000. In effect, therefore, his win was worth a total of ¥420,000. At the end of the line is the ¥17,000,000 first prize annually pocketed by Fujisawa Shuko.



Manfred Wimmer's Promotion to 2-dan

White: Nagasaki Yuji 2-dan

Black: Manfred Wimmer 1-dan

no komi; time: 5 hours each (no byo-yomi)

date: 8th November, 1978


This game was played ten months after Wimmer became a professional shodan at the Kansai Ki-in (see Go World No. 6). His combined record in the spring and autumn sessions of the oteai was 8 wins, 3 jigo and 4 losses. Although wins on white gain more promotion points, Wimmer had calculated that a win in this game would still do the trick.




besides Nagasaki's reply at 20 is White 1 in Dia. 2, played by Kerwin in an informal game. Black is able to squeeze, but it is hard to say just how good this squeeze is. In the game Wimmer went wrong by playing 10 at 11, for connecting at 10 here is essential. A fight would then develop after the sequence to 14.

Black 23 is the crucial move — permitting White to hane at 25 would be disastrous. White lives with 26 and 28, but there is some aji remaining in the corner.

Dia. 3. Presuming Black later reinforces around 'a' (and is safe at the top), he has the placement of 1. Playing the ko at 6 is too dangerous, so White will live with 8, letting Black capture with 9.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 4. If instead White plays 4 here, Black can pick up the corner stones. Though gote, these are large endgame captures.

Figure 2 (51 – 100)

White 64. White thought that this would be sente, threatening to kill Black with 1 in Dia. 5. However, Black counters with 2 to 10, making miai of capturing three white stones and of giving atari to 5. White 'a' instead of 64 would have been sente.

White 74. An unfortunate sequence for Black — not only does he lose eye-shape, but also White 82 becomes sente, making Black 93 gote. Black 75 should have been at 76.

Black 95. Black 'a' is better shape.

Figure 3 (101 – 156)

White 16, taking sente, is well-timed, though





Figure 1 (1 – 50)


Figure 1 (1 – 50)

Black 13. The 'Wimmer joseki'. Black 13 looks unorthodox (pushing at 14 is usual), but a tewari analysis gives it some theoretical justification, as the more usual joseki sequence in Dia. 1 gives the same result.

White 18. Not White 76, of course, as Black builds up his moyo with Black 79, then Black 18. We do not have the space here for a full discussion of Wimmer's move, but another possibility



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Figure 2 (51 - 100)

81: connects; 92: connects

it gives up two endgame points.

White 24. White 'a' is better. In the continuation here White loses some of the ground he gained in the sequence from 74 in the previous figure.

White 48 gains nothing; simply extending at 'b' is correct.

Black 55 is worth ten points. Perhaps White should have played 44 at 'c', while even 52 at 55 would be better, as it is sente. White would not have to answer Black 54.

Figure 4 (157 - 217)

Black 59. Wimmer felt that 59 at 64 was not sufficient to win; likewise 63 at 64. A serious ko fight develops, but Nagasaki was almost out of time at this stage. At the Kansai Ki-in there is no byo-yomi for players under 5-dan.






Figure 3 (101 - 156)



Dia. 5

10: connects



Dia. 6

23: at 21; 26: at 27




Figure 4 (157 - 217)

ko: 68, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92, 95, 98, 101, 104, 107, 110, 113, 116

White 70. What if White connects at 65, that is, at 1 in Dia. 6, then cuts at 3? The sequence to 30 seems forced, after which the ko fight should favour Black, as White has to fill an extra liberty inside Black's corner group.

White 76. Connecting at 65, giving up the top right corner, would be better. Black gains eleven points in the exchange of groups, but then White has sente to invade at 'a' (the ordinary move at 'b' would not be enough). White 'a' could not be caught and is clearly worth more than eleven points. However, this move was discovered by Magari 9-dan; expecting a 2-dan with 30 seconds on his clock to find it is a different matter.

White 94. Too small. White should connect at 65, then invade at 'a'.

When Nagasaki finally ran out of time, the game was very close, assuming that he would not have seen White 'a' but played 'b' instead. In any case, creating complications in the bottom left corner in effect secured Wimmer his 2-dan promotion.

White loses on time after Black 217.

Saitama Prefecture is located in the middle of the Japanese archipelago and, at long. 183° E and lat. 36° N, is just slightly more southerly than San Francisco. In its area of 945,000 acres there lives a population of 5,100,000 people. It is made up of a mountainous western district, a central tableland with some hilly areas and an extensive fertile plain in the east. The southern part adjoins Tokyo, the political and economic centre of Japan.

The favourable climatic conditions and natural surroundings have nurtured in the people of Saitama a sincere, direct attitude and the flexibility and broad-mindedness to adapt to all kinds of people and many different ways of thinking. The prefecture is not only famous for its modern industrial development but also for its numerous traditional crafts and industries nurtured over the course of its 2000 year history. The scenery of Saitama, changing subtly with the seasons, also delights the visitor.

Due to its favourable economic conditions, there has been a remarkably high level of industrial development, particularly in the fields of transport equipment, electrical machinery, scientific industries, etc.

According to the 1977 Saitama Prefecture Industrial Survey, there were a total of 30,756 manufacturing plants in Saitama and the total value of manufactured goods was 33,500,000,000 yen (\$1=¥200), making Saitama one of the leading industrial centres of Japan.


In particular, the transport equipment manufacturing industry, the electrical machinery manufacturing industry and the general machinery manufacturing industry account for one third of the total output of Saitama Prefecture, so these three are its core industries.

However, together with these modern industries, Saitama is also famous for its numerous folk industries, rich in local colour. Dolls, toys, fabrics – these are only some of the traditional folk crafts still flourishing in Saitama. Through the course of history, these folk crafts have reached a high degree of refinement and have also had an influence on the development of modern industries here.

On this occasion we would like to introduce the slipper industry as representative of our craft industries. Our slipper industry is famous for the quality and variety of its products. More than half of our output is destined for the great metropolitan market of Tokyo, but our products are also distributed throughout the length and breadth of Japan. We are responsible for more than 60% of the total slipper production of Japan, producing more than 70,000,000 pairs of slippers annually.

With the increasing Westernization of Japanese life and the demand for high quality products, the demand for our slippers can only become greater and greater. For our part, we are doing our best to improve and diversify our products, with particular attention to pattern, colour, design and quality.

*Enquiries: Market Expansion Officer Commerce and Tourism Section
Saitama Prefecture Department of Commerce and Industry
3-15-1, Takasago, Urawa City
Saitama Prefecture
Tel. 0488-24-2111, Ext. 2752*



Slippers



Sandals



Atomisers



Ash-trays

SAITAMA PREFECTURE


How to Improve at Fuseki (8)

Kato Honinbo

Sanren-sei (iii)

How to attack the double wing formation

In a sanren-sei fuseki the ideal extension is to the side star-point or the point below it on the third line. That is to say, the ideal formation is the double wing extension from the star-point. For example —



Dia. 1

Dia. 1. The addition of Black ▲ makes ideal shape. If Black can also make a corner enclosure, at 'a', for example, he completes an almost impregnable moyo.

This means that now is the time for White to launch a challenge. The theme of this instalment is the question of how White can reduce Black's moyo and how Black should answer.

The most common move is the approach move at 'b'. Playing on the other side at 'c' is not recommended, as Black might be able to build up an impregnable position on the side through attacking White 'c'. The rule is to make an approach move on the more valuable side, the side on which it is easier to make territory. In this case, the right side is clearly worth more than the top.


Besides 'b', the unorthodox approach move at 'd' and the simple invasion at 'e' are also possible. We will look at all of them.

The small knight approach move


When you make an approach move, the other

player has more stones in the area than you do, so the important thing is to avoid being subjected to a one-sided attack. From the point of view of the other player, therefore, the aim should be to attack severely in order to prevent the opponent from settling himself easily after making an approach move.

Dia. 2. The commonplace move of Black 1 in answer to White ▲ is a failure. White easily settles himself with 2 and 4. If next Black 'a', White is happy to extend to 'b'.




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Black 1 is the only move — Black must make a severe attack. Black defends at 3 after making White play 2. White continues with 4. If he played 'a' instead, Black 'b' or 'c' would be good enough.

Dia. 4. There is no need to worry about White 1. After Black 2, White is the one in trouble. If White 3 and 5, Black keeps up the pressure with 6. Instead of 5 —



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 5. If White plays 1, Black strikes with 2 and 4, making miai of 'a' and 'b'. White has no choice but to follow Dia. 4.


Instead of 3 in Dia. 4 —

Dia. 6. White 1 is unreasonable, as Black blocks at 2. White 3 is refuted by Black 4; if next White 'a', then the sequence Black 'b', White 'c' etc. through to 'j' follows. White's cut off stones are in a bad way.

For the above reasons, the moves to 4 in Dia. 3 can be regarded as a set pattern. Next —



Dia. 6




Dia. 7


Dia. 7. Black 1 is strongest: in almost all cases this diagonal move is the correct continuation. If White blocks at 2, Black continues the attack with 3 and 5. The more severe move of 'a' instead of 3 is also feasible. Black now aims at 'b', taking profit while continuing his attack.

Dia. 8. White might answer Black 1 by attaching at 2. After the hane at 3, Black 5 is the vital point for forcing White into bad shape. White 6 is essential, so Black takes away White's base with 7. After White reinforces with 9, Black pushes up at 9 and is satisfied.

Dia. 9. White 2 is a good move; it may look thin, but there is nothing that Black can do about this immediately. Black 3 next is standard, giving



Dia. 8




Dia. 9


the peaceful result to 7. However, White must bear in mind that Black might cut at 6 instead of 5. This cut is quite strong, so if White wants to prevent it, he must play 4 at 6. Black 4, White 'a', Black 'b' would follow, giving Black a reasonable result.

Dia. 10. Jumping immediately to 1, omitting the diagonal move in Dia. 9, is also often seen in professional play. Undeniably, however, this way of playing lacks severity. White can just concentrate on living with 2 to 10, giving a result which is less than 100% for Black.

In positions in which White does not want to help Black to solidify himself with 3, 5 and 7 —



Dia. 10



Dia. 11


Dia. 11. White can slide along the side with 2, an unspectacular move which can be quite effective. The sequence to 13 follows naturally; White may not yet have secure eye-shape, but he has considerably reduced Black's territory.

The position in Dia. 1 came up in a 1974 game between Otake (White) and myself in the Nihon Ki-in Championship and the continuation was as in Dia. 11. Reviewing this game, I now feel that I should have played Black 1 at 3.


Unorthodox approach moves

When the usual approach move does not work well—

Dia. 12. White can try the unorthodox approach move of 1. However, Black has no reason whatsoever to be afraid of moves like this. Black gets a magnificent position with 2 to 6. He can be pleased with this result, for since White has no base, Black can look forward to attacking him. When Black plays 2 —




Dia. 12




Dia. 13

Dia. 13. White could try the makeshift of running along the side with 1, but then Black seals him in with 2 and 4. Even though White lives on the side, Black is satisfied with building up a solid wall on the outside.

Dia. 14. If for some reason Black wants to prevent White from playing 1 in *Dia. 13*, he can attach at 2. The result to 6 is good enough.



Dia. 14




Dia. 15

The 3-3 point

Whether White makes the usual approach move or an irregular one, he is destined to come under attack. If he dislikes this, the simplest thing to do is to invade at the 3-3 point. This may be a somewhat negative strategy, but in many positions it may be the only move.


Dia. 15. When White enters at the 3-3 point, the first problem is to decide on which side to block. The answer is on the more valuable side,



Dia. 16

that is, the side on which it is easier to make territory. Consequently, blocking at 2 is a failure. The right side is more important, yet the sequence to 12 leaves Black open at the side there. The ▲stones are crying.

Dia. 16. Blocking at 2 is the only move. This way Black gets a large territorial moyo on the right side. Consequently, White should think twice about invading at the 3-3 point in a position like this; he should after all make an approach move.



Dia. 17 13: connects

Dia. 17. From the 1974 Honinbo title match, Ishida (White) v. Takemiya.

Two positions relevant to our theme come up in this game. In the top left Black invades at the 3-3 point, but an approach move at 'a' is of course also feasible. Needless to say, White must block at 2. The two-step hane at 6 is worth looking at closely.


Dia. 18. If White makes the ordinary extension to 1, the sequence to 7 follows, but this result is not satisfying for White. He does get a nice moyo on the left, but the $\triangle$ $\blacktriangle$ exchange is now bad for him. If the sequence to 7 had been played first, White would not make the $\triangle$ approach move. White is open on the side at the top, so rather than playing there, making an approach move at 'a' is more appealing. Black was hoping for the result here when he invaded at the 3-3 point. That is why White switched to 6 in Dia. 17.

Capturing a stone with 7 and 9 in Dia. 17 was trivial.


Dia. 19. After the game Takemiya commented that Black 1 and 3 here were better. White must connect at 4, so with 5 etc. Black establishes a base on the left side, the area which is most important for White.

In Dia. 17 White gets sente to make the approach move at 14. The moves to 18 are a set pattern. Black keeps the attack at 'b' in reserve and starts a fight at the top with 19 and 21.

This concludes our discussion of the sanren-sei.



Dia. 18



Dia. 19

In the next issue we will go on to the Chinese-style fuseki.

(*'Igo Club'*, August 1978)

Go World News

(Continued from page 6)

all-time record, unapproached by any other modern player. Sakata has been in superb form since becoming Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Nihon Ki-in in June last year. He is the first active player to fill this post.

Tono Wins 26th NHK Cup

Two dark horses ended up in the final of the 26th NHK Cup, the leading TV hayago tournament. Tono Hiroaki 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in defeated Takemiya, Hashimoto Shoji, Magari and Cho Chikun to reach the final. His opponent there was Takagi Shoichi 8-dan, who also overcame impressive opposition in the guise of Hashimoto Utaro, Shimamura, Ohira and Otake Meijin. In the final, played on the 26th February, Tono defeated Takagi by resignation, thus winning his second TV tournament.

4th Gosei League

Three of the five places in this mini-league have already been decided. Hane 8-dan defeated the previous title-holder, Kato Masao, in the final elimination round. He is joined in the league by Kudo and Cho Chikun, while Sakata will play Iwata 9-dan and Ishida Yoshio will meet Sugiuchi



Tono Hiroaki 9-dan

to decide the remaining two places. The current title-holder is Otake.


'Go World' Back Numbers

All back numbers of 'Go World' are in stock. 'Go World' is the only professional magazine in a western language devoted to Go and it provides a complete record of all major title matches, together with a comprehensive range of instructional articles and a coverage of Go events around the world. Make sure that your collection is complete. Back issues, beginning with No. 1 (May-June 1977) are available at ¥730 each, including postage.


GOOD AND BAD STYLE

Problem: Black to play


Find the best endgame move.




45: Black must defend against White 'a'.




46: How should Black deal with White Δ ?



47: The ordinary move is not enough.




48: What is the best way for Black to live?




49: There's a lot of aji in White's corner.


Vulgar style




Black 1 is gote and that's not good enough.




If Black 1, White 2 and 4 are sente.



If Black 1, White has a nice answer at 2, securing the whole corner.




If Black 1, playing in at 'a' creates ko threats for White.




Black 1 is sente, but it is just as uninspired as the hane in no. 47.


Correct Style




Black 1 is subtle. After 3 White must play 4 to forestall Black 4.




If White 2, the cut at 'a' is no longer possible.




Black 1 is the move.




If White 2, Black plays 3, gaining a point. Note that if Black omits 3, White will play there.




White is unable to resist the placement at 1, so Black connects underneath with 3.




If White 2, Black sets up a large ko with 3 and 5. This would be unreasonable for White.




Black 1 is correct. White now has no ko threats.



Black can ignore White 1. If White 3, Black plays 4, then lives with 'a'.



Cutting at 1 is a tesuji.



Black 3 and 5 set up a ko, but White cannot fight it because of the threat of Black 'a'.

THE JAPANESE RULES OF GO

James Davies

This year, because of the first World Amateur Go Championship, the Nihon Ki-in's official Laws of Go have been newly translated into English. Or rather about half of them have been translated. The rest were omitted as being irrelevant to the tournament. One section was also substantially revised. In this article we shall take a look at the original version, see what it contains, and mention some problems.

The first problem is that printed copies of the Laws are not readily obtainable. They were once put out as a supplement to *Igo Club*, but that was years ago and all remaining copies seem to be in private hands. The reader who can decipher Japanese and wants to read the full Laws for himself is advised to get Hayashi Yutaka's *Igo Hyakka Jiten*, in which they appear on pages 417 to 453. Much other rule-related information can also be found there.

Once obtained, the Laws can be seen to consist of a preamble, followed by seventy articles, divided into ten chapters, with explanatory diagrams, followed by an appendix (another preamble, then ten more articles), followed by some 'precedents', followed by more diagrams of explanation. Let's take all this in order.

Chapter 1 of the main body of the Laws gives a brief general description of the game. Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to the players, their ranks, the board, the stones, and the bowls. These three chapters really leave nothing to be desired. They are a model of completeness and clarity, and at times they ascend to philosophical heights. Article 10, for example, begins with the statement that 'The stones are devices for marking the players' moves on the board.' 'Tools for expressing' might be a more literal translation. Anyway, it is hard to read the Japanese sentence without being reminded of Plato's parable of the cave, with the moves as the ideal forms, perceived in the minds of the players and their Creator, and the stones as mere shadows of these ideal forms which they imperfectly (chipped, perhaps, and probably not centered on the intersections) represent.

Chapter 4, which was considerably shortened in the translation, describes the various possible terms of play, i.e. the players' precise relative

status as expressed by the handicap arrangement. This is treated more seriously in Japan than in the West. Look at a game record in English and you will see the words 'black' and 'white' at the top, followed by the players' names. A Japanese game record would probably tell you not only who played black and white but who was considered stronger and what the handicap was — if Black was taking black in every game, or just in two games out of three, or if they were evenly alternating black and white, etc. Of course in most modern tournaments all games are played on even terms with komi, so this is not so important.

In chapter 5 we come to the rules of play themselves. The only omissions in the translation were article 23, which forbids passing before the end of the game, and paragraph 4 of the ko rule. This latter states that if there are two kos, A and B, on the board and Black, say, has just captured the white stone in ko B, he may not immediately capture the white stone in ko A when that would repeat a former configuration.

This sounds as if it means something, but when you try to find specific situations to which it applies you run into certain difficulties. To start with, if Black has just captured the white stone in ko B it should now be White's turn and Black has no business capturing in ko A, regardless of any former configurations. Even if you overlook this fault in the wording, it is hard to construct situations for which the rule means anything significant. The reader is invited to try. Perhaps this paragraph is what Go Seigen was referring to when he once said, 'If you feed the Nihon Ki-in's ko rule into a computer, you get back a "No!"' Its deletion from the translation is no loss.

Chapter 6 describes eye shape, life, death, seki, and territory. One wonders why the rule writers chose to say that:

- (1) Stones in a seki are alive.
- (2) Live stones surround territory.
- (3) Stones in a seki cannot surround territory.

But let's not belabor this doubtful syllogism, and proceed to the chapter that was substantially revised.

That is chapter 7, on the end of the game. In

the original Laws, when the last move of any value has been made the game is supposed to end by mutual agreement. Then, with competition over, the players can relax and fill in the neutral points (dame), not necessarily in alternation, and remove the dead stones, rearrange the territories, and count the score. The revised laws have the players continuing alternate play until the last neutral point has been filled; only then does the game end.

The reason for this change is that as the neutral points are filled in, it usually becomes necessary for the players to connect and defend at various points inside their territory. What if a player fails to make one of these defensive moves? Under the original rules the game is already supposed to be over, so his opponent is not allowed to take advantage of the slip unless he first warns the player that defense is needed. Only if the player refuses to heed the warning may his opponent go ahead and capture or invade.

This may be all right when the player has neglected a defensive move because he was busy filling neutral points on one side of the board and not watching too closely what his opponent was doing on the other, but when the player is completely unaware of the need to defend, it seems a little unfair to require his opponent to warn him. Unawareness is especially likely to happen in amateur games,* so the rule was changed for the World Amateur Championship.

The new rule applies only to this tournament, but if it were universally adopted it would be a big step toward closing the gap between the Japanese and Chinese rules. Under the Chinese rules the neutral points count as territory, so alternate play always continues until they are filled.

Chapter 8 of the Laws says that any questions arising in connection with life, death, ko, seki, etc. are to be settled in accordance with precedents given below, or to be ruled on by the Nihon Ki-in if no precedent exists.

Chapters 9 and 10 and the appendix were entirely omitted from the translation. They cover the way violations of the rules are to be handled


*It is not unknown in professional play, either. Hayashi recalls a case in a Honinbo tournament game between Tainaka, 9-dan, and Akagi, 8-dan. Tainaka warned Akagi, who defended, but later someone wondered if this was not equivalent to the retraction of a move. The players were unsure of the Nihon Ki-in's rule and had to look it up.



(the violator loses the game), the players' deportment, etc. As a sample of what they contain we can take paragraph 2 of the first article of the appendix: 'The higher ranking player shall sit in the higher ranking seat.' This is not an empty distinction, for in article 5 we read that, 'At the end of the game the player in the lower ranking seat shall wipe off the board and put the equipment away.' A more significant provision (article 61 of the rules proper) explains what to do if a player has inadvertently moved a stone on the board, by brushing it with his sleeve for example. If the location of the stone makes a difference and the players cannot agree about it, the game ends then and there without result.

After the rules proper and the appendix come the Nihon Ki-in's precedents. This is the section of the Laws that has always stirred the most controversy. The precedents say things like 'a bent four in the corner is unconditionally dead,' 'direct kos must be eliminated at the end of the game,' and 'when a triple ko arises and neither side is willing to give in, the game ends without result.' These are arbitrary decisions, made to simplify the game, and are not always logically justifiable. They are a constant target for criticism.

As far as I know, freak positions not covered by the Nihon Ki-in's precedents have never arisen in professional tournament play, but in the November 1954 issue of *Kido* Fujimura Yoshikatsu, a professional 5-dan, reported that the position shown in Dia. 1 had arisen in one of his five-stone teaching games. He presented the diagram as a problem for the reader, with the comment that anyone who could work it out was rather strong.

Fujimura's opponent had decided that it was hopeless to try to catch the four white stones in the corner. The best move then would be to





4, 6: pass

descend at 1 in Dia. 2, making two eyes on the right side, and let White have a seki with 2 and 4.* This, however, left Black behind in the game, so he resigned.


Fujimura rejected the resignation and pointed out a much better way for Black to play, beginning with 1 in Dia. 3. White 2 and 4 reduce Black to one eye on the right side, and this begins to look like another form of seki, but Fujimura contended that White's stones were actually dead and could be removed at the end of the game without further play.

After 4 in Dia. 3 White has no further way to attack, so Black can turn away and finish the rest of the game. Then, in theory, he can come back and capture White in the following way. First he goes around the board eliminating all White's ko threats. Next he plays 1, 3, 5, and 7 in Dia. 4. This creates enough liberties for him to give atari with 9 in Dia. 5. White 10 makes a direct ko, but Black has the first ko capture with 11 and White has no ko threats, so White is dead. In fact, he is dead the moment Black puts down 1 in Dia. 3; White 2 etc. will not actually be played. When they finished the game in this way Black won by three points, much to his delight.

The situation in Dias. 3 to 5 is precisely analogous to the bent four in the corner. White can not attack, and Black can choose his own time (namely after eliminating White's ko threats) to start the ko. If a bent four in the corner is unconditionally dead, White should be unconditionally dead in Dia. 3, too. Fujimura argued that this should be made a new rule.

His argument, however, did not go unchal-

*Depending on ko threats, 3 might have to be played at the left of 4.






12: pass


lenged. Other players wrote in to point out that there might be ko threats that Black could not eliminate. Such ko threats could exist if there were another seki on the board, for example, or a double ko, so a rule stating that White was unconditionally dead would not always be logically correct. The same is true, of course, of the bent-four rule.

The debate raged for the better part of a year in the pages of *Kido*, with Fujimura and the Nihon Ki-in's Laws both coming in for some outspoken criticism. The Nihon Ki-in appointed a group to look into the problem. This group determined that (1) the bent-four rule was an isolated rule which could not be extended by analogy and (2) the Nihon Ki-in's rules committee should consider the Fujimura question and make a new rule to cover it.

And that, apparently, is where the matter ended. The required new rule has never been made. The Fujimura question remains unresolved.

It is not hard to devise other positions lying outside the Nihon Ki-in's precedents. One that occurs naturally on a 5 x 5 board is shown in Dia. 6. Black has just played the triangled stone. White responds with 1 in Dia. 7. Black takes the ko with 2, giving Dia. 8. White's best move now is to pass; anything else would be suicidal. May he pass? If he does, Black will pass too; anything else would be suicidal for him, since he is behind in the race to capture. May White now retake the ko, or is the game over? If the game is over, which





Dia. 9

stones are alive and which are dead? A strict interpretation of the Laws might be that (1) White may pass. (2) After Black passes White may not retake the ko. (3) The game is over. (4) All the stones are dead. White then wins by one point, for all stones are prisoners and Black has played one more. There is plenty of room for argument, however, on all these points.

Another position about which one might have questions is the 'moonshine life' shown in Dia. 9. There are two ways of interpreting the Nihon Ki-in's Laws in regard to this. One way is to say that the black group in the top left corner has a dead shape, as defined in the life, death, seki, and territory chapter, and should therefore be removed at the end of the game. The other way is to say that if White tries to capture, Black can use the double ko in the bottom right corner as an infinite source of ko threats. In other words, the position is a triple ko and either Black is alive or the game ends without result.

One searches in vain for any explicit statement in the Laws about which interpretation is correct. In Japan, however, the first interpretation is universally accepted. Black is dead. Perhaps the rule makers decided that since no one was challenging this interpretation there was no need to mention it specifically.

This interpretation did not always prevail, however. Hayashi quotes a decision in 1253 in favor of the second interpretation: Black is alive. The switch to the modern interpretation took place during the Edo period — less than two hundred years ago, according to one story, at a conference called by Honinbo Genjo.

The logical defects of the Nihon Ki-in's Laws are well recognized in Japan. A number of amateur rule theoreticians have proposed alternative sets of rules; thus we have the Yasunaga rules, the Shimada rules, the Kaise rules, the Ikeda rules, and I suppose others. There are also many sets that have been proposed abroad. Unfortunately these sets

of rules all differ from each other in various ways.

One thing they generally agree on is that the Nihon Ki-in's precedents should be abolished and the positions they cover should be settled, when necessary, by having the players play them out. Triple kos would be resolved by prohibiting full-board repetition. The bent four in the corner and Fujimura's position would become sekis in certain situations. Direct kos would not always have to be eliminated at the end of the game.

Other problem areas include the counting of territory in sekis, passing, and the definition of the end of the game. There is less agreement here. To take up just the last two points, the Nihon Ki-in's rule that you may not pass before the end of the game is slightly fatuous. As a Professor Shinagawa of Kyoto University once observed in *Gekkan Gogaku*, all you have to do if you want to pass is to swear that you *think* the game is over. If you stick by your guns, there is not much your opponent can do but accept the pass and either pass himself or play on. In the latter case you are allowed to resume play and answer his moves; the Laws explicitly state this.


What most rule theoreticians seem to do is to allow passing and let two consecutive passes define the end of the game. They also allow (require, in one case) play to continue after the end of the game to settle life-and-death questions. To keep things fair during this second phase of the game, if a player passes he must pay his opponent one penalty stone, and the number of stones played or paid by both sides must be the same. Opinions differ on whether or not penalty stones should be paid for passes made before the end of the game. If they are paid, and if territory is counted in sekis, the result is something very close to the Chinese rules.

It would be nice to have the defects in the Nihon Ki-in's Laws repaired, but the Nihon Ki-in is largely indifferent to rules questions. Its rules committee, although never officially disbanded, has become inactive. The only significant rules change ever made was the standardization of the komi at 5½ points. One hopes for more, but as Hayashi has remarked, professional players who make their living at go would not necessarily welcome any tampering with its rules. Besides, the Nihon Ki-in's Law usually work perfectly well in their present form. The outlook for change does not seem especially bright.


Life and Death Page

Twelve problems, ranging from the ridiculous to the sublime. Most have unconditional solutions, but in two of them the answer is a ko and one of them has no answer at all — it can't be


done. Finding these three misfits is part of the challenge. Answers are on the next two pages — no peeking!




1. Black to kill




2. Black to kill




3. Black to kill




4. Black to live




5. Black to live




6. Black to kill




7. Black to kill




8. Black to live




9. Black to kill



10. Black to kill




11. Black to live




12. Black to kill

ANSWERS

Answer to No. 1




Correct — White dies. All Black has to do is stretch his legs and slide in to 1. White cannot capture him, no matter how he tries.




Failure. The attachment at 1 is another key point, but White has the clever combination of 2 and 4 with which he can live.


Answer to No. 2



Answer to No. 7




Correct — *White dies*. Black 1 is the eye-stealing tesuji. If White plays 2, Black extends at 3. Next if White 'a', Black 'b'.




Variation. If White tries to defend at 2, Black cuts at 3. White can clearly be pronounced dead.

Answer to No. 9




Correct — *White dies*. Black 1 is the tesuji. If White plays 2, Black plays 3 and vice versa.




Failure. This Black 1 is the wrong tesuji. White lives with 2 and 4.

Answer to No. 11




Correct — *Black lives*. The descent at 1 is a nice move. White attacks with 2 and 4, but Black lives with 3 and 5.




Failure. Descending on this side is not so good. White hanes at 2 and plays 4. R. I. P.

Answer to No. 8




Correct — *ko*. Defending from the inside with 1 is Black's best move, or rather his only move. The result through 5 is a ko.




Failure. If Black connects at 1, White kills him with the hane at 2 and placement at 4.

Answer to No. 10




No answer — *White lives*. It looks as if Black can kill White with 1, but White resists with 2. After Black 3 —




Continuation. White elegantly gives up three stones with 4 and forms his second eye with 6.

Answer to No. 12




Correct — *White dies*. Black strikes from within at 1, forcing 2, then plays 3. Next if White 'a', Black 'b' and White cannot play 'c'.



Failure. With the beautiful sequence in the last diagram, there is no need to play 1 and let White have a ko.


Practical Tactics and Tesuji

Rin Kaiho, 9-dan




Problem

Problem. White has invaded at 1. This is a perfectly good move; there is nothing unreasonable or strange about it. Neither is there any reason for Black to be confused by it, but confusion seems rife nonetheless. Just a slight shift in position makes most amateurs lose their bearings. How should Black respond?




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 1: correct. He should block from the corner at 1. We shall soon see why, but first take a good look at this move and remember it. It works, while Black 'a' and 'b' do not.

Dia. 2: comparison. This Black 1 is also correct, but the shape is slightly different. That is probably the source of confusion.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4


Dia. 3: bad for White. White's invasion is a light probing move, made to test Black's response. It cannot be followed up to any immediate advantage. If White pulls it out with 2 and 4

he has to make bad shape, which puts him at a disadvantage. Black can leave things as they are or he can resist directly with 'a'.

Dia. 4: correct. White is more likely to hane at 2, push up at 4, then hane again at 6.




Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 5: correct. Continuing from the last diagram, Black's simplest reply is to extend at 1. White gets a stone with 2 to 6, but Black's result is more than adequate. This is the way of playing I would like to recommend.

Dia. 6: alternative. One feels tempted to cut at 1 instead. This is not bad for Black, but it is annoying to be slapped down by White 2, and White ends with sente to start mischief elsewhere.



Dia. 7.



Dia. 8

Dia. 7: failure. Black must not try to capture White 1. The stone is uncapturable, and although it depends on the situation, the outer influence Black gets is usually not enough to compensate for the loss of the corner.

Dia. 8: failure. The same applies here. Although White intended making no more than a light probe, unwise resistance has caused Black to suffer major damage.

('Gekkan Gogaku', Jan. 1979. Translated by J. Davies)

Annals of Handicap Go: Sekiyama v. Miki (2)

Commentary by Miyamamoto Naoki, 9-dan

Sekiyama was born in 1909 in Amagasaki, a town outside Osaka. Later he moved to Tokyo,

became a pupil of Suzuki Tamejiro, and tested his talents against such fellow pupils as Kitani,

Shimamura, and Handa. 'Play every move as if it were the first in your life,' was one of his mottos, and with his intensely serious approach to the game he almost never made oversights. Professionals admired his restrained style of play. 'Five points in reverse sente is worth taking even early in the opening,' he used to say. *Gote no sente** was another phrase that typified his style; it is also the title of one of his best known books. He played solidly, with an inward strength acquired from his teacher Suzuki, and he quickly mastered the art of winning with black. Next he absorbed himself in studying the games of Meijin Shuei. He claimed this made him a stone stronger, and he became a master with white, too.

It is a pity that when Go Seigen was at his peak, destroying one strong rival after another, Sekiyama's health did not permit a ten-game match between the two. Sekiyama won the Oteai tournament, the biggest tournament before the war, more often than Go, and in the first Honinbo tournament he triumphed while holding Go to third place. In 1932, when Go had an eighteen-game winning streak on, Sekiyama stopped him by three points with white, no komi.

White: Sekiyama Riichi

Black: Miki Masa

September 5 and 8, 1947

Figure 1 (1 - 24)

This game lasted over ten hours and was played on two days, with a two-day rest in between.

Black 4 was a good move, but Black could also have answered 3 at 16, leaving 4 and 'a' as miai.

Before pincering at 7 White played 5, a move with all sorts of implications. Besides spreading out on the left side, it piled Black up on the upper side and made 1 into a light stone.

White 7 to Black 22 are a joseki. A player who comprehends the meaning of each move probably has the strength of a shodan, but the trouble with this joseki is that White gets to play on both the left and lower sides, at 21 and 23. This is a joseki for handicap games, not for even games. With 20 Black should turn away and attack the upper side at 'b'. If White clamps at 1 in Dia. 1, Black can descend at 2, then cut at 4.





Figure 1 (1 - 24)



Dia. 1

If Black must play in the corner, he should omit 20 and again descend at 2 in Dia. 1. If White extends on the lower side, Black invades the left side, divides him in two, and takes the offensive.

Black 24 was all right for a four-stone game, but one would have preferred to see Black play 'b' on the upper side and carry out the intention behind Black 4. White 23 is far enough from the lower right corner that any white attack there can easily be handled.

*A gote move with a sente continuation.





Figure 2 (25 - 37)

Figure 2 (25 - 37)

White 29 marked a major choice in the game. If White had simply played 37, Black would obviously have pincerd him from below, so White 29 was played to prepare for 37. At the same time, White was abandoning the idea of invading the lower right corner at the three-three point. If he invaded, Black would block from the left and White's position on the lower side would be weakened. White's overall strategy was to expand his formation on the lower side, not weaken it.

With 30 Black should have hane at 31. White's hane and connecting at 33 and 35 left Black with two cutting points, so White was able to arrive on schedule at 37. Black 36 defended one of the cutting points, but the other was still exposed.

If Black had hane at 31 and White had cut at 2 in Dia. 2, Black could have followed the sequence shown and invaded the lower side at 11. If White played 12 Black could divide him with 13 and 15. This would hurt, because White's strategy is to take things slowly in the opening and avoid being attacked. Of course if



Dia. 2

White played 2 at 4 in Dia. 2 Black would connect at 2.

Figure 3 (38 - 40)

Through White 39 one notes that Black's and White's stones were both divided into four groups. White was performing a delicate balancing act, aiming for a close finish. Instead of playing 38, Black should have tried to break the balance by invading the lower side at 11 in Dia. 2, or at the point diagonally above that to the left.

Black 40 was slack - the most questionable move of the opening. If Black's intention was





Figure 3 (38 - 40)

to lead his upper right group out into the open he was wasting Black 38, which made the corner perfectly alive. If he was trying to divide White and attack he was looking in the wrong place. He had more room, and White had more defects, on the left and lower sides.



Dia. 3

Black 40 could have been 1 in Dia. 3. Through 7 Black takes profit and the circled stone works to its best. Invading the lower side at 'a', or at 11 in Dia. 2, would also have been good. If Black had invaded either the left or lower side he would have had the game won by a wide margin. Missing his chance, he found himself brilliantly




Figure 4 (41 - 71)

forestalled by White in the next figure.


Figure 4 (41 - 71)

Black was trying to attack White's right and upper sides, but White perceived that the danger was greater on the left and lower sides. Anyway, in the short space of the next fifteen moves, of which only eight were his, White managed to complete his defenses in all four places. This was simply magnificent.

Tracing the path White followed, we see him first forcing Black at 41, then strengthening the right side with 43 and 45. This indirectly defended the lower side too, by highlighting Black's cutting points. Black gave White a cutting point above 47, but this was protected by the peep at 61, so White was able to force Black again with 49, 51, and 53. These moves bolstered his left side while limiting Black's territory above, and although they solidified Black's upper left corner, that meant that White could now play at the left of 60 or peep at 61 without compunction to defend his upper side. White 55 completed the operation, a beautifully ordered sequence of moves that must have cost White a great deal of thought. His plan for a close finish was fast becoming a reality.

At 64 we see Black answering White's move by playing right next to it — typical weaker-player behavior. Jumping out one line below 64 was correct shape. Black followed through vigorously at 66, 68 and 70, however, and now was set to enter the lower side at 'a'.

White 71, besides helping link White's center with his left side and reducing Black's territory above, served for the defense of the upper side. The threat of White 14 in Dia. 4, for example, now deterred Black from cutting at 1 and 5.



Dia. 4





Figure 5 (72 - 100)

Figure 5 (72 - 100)

Black 80 was horribly slack. One such mistake forty moves earlier had given White all the last large points of the opening; now White got the last large point of the middle game. Having played 72 and 74, Black had nothing to fear from White 80: Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' and Black has no worries. If Black had to defend here, at least he should have tried jumping to 'd'. His just playing 80 meant that White's stone touching 80 was now expendable.

What Black should really have done was to play 1 in Dia. 5. White would have to defend at 2, but the hane at 3 would then put Black well in the lead. If White cut at 4, Black could



Dia. 5

sacrifice a stone and play 5 and 7. It should not be hard to verify that he is safely linked up, either above or below.

Black 82 should also have been 1 in Dia. 5, or if he was worried about his linkage Black 85 would have been good, leaving 1 in Dia. 5 and 86 as miai. There was no need to exchange 82 for 83. Black 82 and 84 were practically worthless.

Black played 100 and headed into the small endgame, but first he made two meaningless moves at 94 and 98. He should have played 94 at 98, and once he played 94 he should have held 98 in reserve and just played 100. Whether 94 is still on the board or not makes a big difference if Black pushes in at 'e'.

Black 100 was large, but playing here now in gote was much smaller than playing 80 at 81 would have been.

Figure 6 (101 - 159)

Black 'a' would have been better than 8 and 10. Black 12 aimed at 'b'. White 15 and 17 were related to eye shape. Black 18 was too small; Black should have blocked at 19. White 19 was big, and now that Black had allowed it




Figure 6 (101 - 159)

he should have answered it with 21. After White captured two stones Black could switch to 23. Profit and loss in the upper right corner would be the same and Black would have sente. Perhaps he was worried about losing the cut at 'c', but if he later recaptured at the right of 20 White would have to defend at 'c' eventually just the same.

White 23 was the largest move on the board. Not only did it complete White's shape, but it gave him the cut at 45, followed by the placement at 49. There were several 'drop-offs' in the flow of this game and at each one White got the important large move, leaving Black only smaller moves with which to continue.

Black 30 should have been the peep at 'b' mentioned above. If Black was going to play 30, his original connection at 12 was not worth very much.

Black 40 should have been 'd', or 59.

Black had no choice but to answer 49 with 50 etc. This was part of the value of White 23.

Black 58 should again have been either 'd' or 59. For reasons related to Black 'c' White's cutting at 58 would be gote, and Black would have a sure win. One wonders why White did not play 55 at 59, but then Black 57 would have given him a sure loss. White had safely negotiated another drop-off in the game.

Figure 7 (160 – 194)

Black 62 and 64 were the same mistake twice: 62 should have been at 63, and 64 at 65.

White 73 and 75 were by now very big – four points in sente. Black had plenty of chances to prevent them. Instead of 70, for instance, he could have played Black 79, White 'a', Black 75. He could also have exchanged Black 'a' for White 79 before defending at 76. Black 'a', White 78, Black 79 instead of Black 78, however, would have been no better (or worse) than the moves actually played.

This game ended in a draw, but at any time from 62 on Black could have peeped at 91 in sente, and if he had he would have won by one point. The final ko in the middle of the board automatically goes to him, since he has more ko threats. This figure shows a disappointing black




Figure 7 (160 – 194)

performance.

Miki: 'This was the sixth of our games at Tamashima. Sekiyama's single-minded devotion to go, his innocent personality, and the poor life he was leading touched the heartstrings of the go fans in the area. Several of them brought him to Kasaoka, where he was able to get medical attention from three go-playing doctors. The country was finally settling down after the war, and more of his old friends from Tokyo and Osaka began to visit him. His group of young pupils, including his son Toshio, started to make a name for itself, and his life brightened considerably. Two years after his move to Kasaoka he moved on to Osaka to join the Kansai Ki-in, and in 1952 a game was arranged between him and former Honinbo Iwamoto. This was his first appearance in regular competition in eleven years, and the last in his life.'

Moves after 194 omitted. Black and White draw.


('Igo Shincho' Aug. 1978. Translated by James Davies. This is part 2 of a three-part series.)

Note. For readers who are wondering how White managed to draw this game: his next move was probably a hane on the right edge.

The Advantage of Playing Last


James Davies

One of the common beliefs about the endgame is that it is possible to give a numerical value, or size, to every move, and that the best strategy is to play the largest move on the board. Fortunately go is not that simple — sente and gote must also be considered — but one might at least expect that for any two moves, X and Y, it should be possible to say whether X is better than Y or Y is better than X or the two are equal. That this is not true has been pointed out by Olof Hanner, a Swedish mathematician who once published an abstract analysis of the endgame in the *Pacific Journal of Mathematics* (Vol 9, No. 1). To explain his ideas, we shall consider the following two moves.



If you count in the normal way you will find that move A is worth 10 points and move B is worth $9\frac{1}{2}$, a value which comes from averaging Black and White 'b'. That makes A half a point bigger than B, but can we really say that A is better than B? We shall investigate this question by constructing some small-board positions.


Dia. 1. Black to play. Should he start with A on the upper side or B on the lower side?




Dia. 2. If he starts with the supposedly larger move at A, he loses by 1 point. The score is Black 25, White 26.

Dia. 3. But if he starts with the 'smaller' move at B, he wins by 1 point, 20 to 19.

In this position the smaller move (B) was actually two points better for Black than the



Dia. 3




Dia. 4


larger one. Before we jump to conclusions, however, let's look at another position, in which a third move has been added.

Dia. 4. Black to play again. A or B?

Dia. 5. On the basis of his experience in Dias. 2 and 3 Black decides to start with B, but now he loses the game by 1 point, 22 to 23.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. Changing to A with his first move, Black wins by 2 points, 27 to 25. Whereas before B was two points better than A, now A is three points better than B. What does this mean?

What it means is that we cannot say either that A is better than B or that B is better than A. Neither statement is true. Nor are A and B equal. In mathematical language, the endgame moves form a *partially ordered set*, many of whose members, A and B for example, are incomparable.

All this is not very helpful to a person trying to find the best move in actual play, but there is something else worth noticing in Dias. 2, 3, 5, and 6. In every case *the side that makes the last move wins the game*. We have found a good example of what Professor Hanner calls 'the advantage of playing last', and what might be called the 'tedomari' advantage in Japanese. This is a strategic principle that can be as important as counting in the endgame. In the above

cases it is more important than the small difference between the numerical values of A and B.

To test this principle, the reader might ask himself how White should play if he has the first move in Dias. 1 and 4. To make the problem more interesting, give Black a three-point komi. Is White's best strategy to start with A or B, or is it to play for the last move?

If the reader works out this problem he will discover another curious fact: the best starting


move for Black need not be the best one for White. This is further proof that A and B are incomparable. The endgame is a complex area, and simple counting is clearly not enough to deal with it.

(This article originally appeared in a slightly different form in 'Gekkan Gogaku', Feb. 1979. It is based on part of a long manuscript on the mathematical foundations of endgame counting by Professor Hanner.)

Correcting The Mistake

Kato Honinbo

A typical scene at the Nihon Ki-in — four or five amateurs were gathered around a board, going over a game. Drawing near, I saw that they were debating the question of how White should play in the position at right. In the actual game he had apparently invaded the upper right corner at the three-three point. The result had been Black 2 to 16 in Dia. 1. Very good. Both players were clearly joseki experts.




Dia. 1


'I invaded the corner so as to lead Black into helping me defend my right-side group,' said the man who had been White.

'But I was happy to cooperate, because turning at 16 made the upper side potentially huge,' said his opponent. I agreed. Black 16 was a good point. Black had come out ahead.

'I would have played White 1 in Dia. 2', said an onlooker. 'That would keep Black's upper



The Mistake




Dia. 2

side from getting too big and help out the triangled stone, and White could see Black's response before planning his next move.'

An excellent idea, one of which I partially approved. If White were to play on the upper side, this would be the point.


Another onlooker, perhaps tipped off by my reaction, spoke up. 'The urgent part of the board is the left side. White should make the pincer attack at 1 in Dia. 3. Black will probably escape with 2, and White can broaden the battle with 3, keeping the initiative.'



Dia. 3

Another excellent idea, with certain elements of indisputable logic. If Black plays 2, White 3 does work beautifully.


But the correct move was the three-three-point invasion in Dia. 4. Given a double-wing shape like the one marked, this three-three-point invasion is an absolute must. One shouldn't miss it for anything. White steals the corner territory in sente, and Black's triangled stones



Dia. 4

are left unsatisfactorily close to 6 and 10. First White should play this sequence; then he can proceed to some other large point — 'a', for example, or one of the moves suggested above.


If Black were to play here, he would defend at the three-three point as shown in Dia. 5.



Dia. 5

The triangled stones then become very well placed, making a framework that White cannot easily invade. For that reason, both Black 16 in Dia. 1 and Black 2 in Dia. 3 should be at 1 in Dia. 5. This was the key point for both sides.

Even if the triangled stones had been a line closer, as in Dia. 6, White 1 would have been




Dia. 6.

an urgent move. This double extension, which is sometimes called the 'folding-door formation,' is considered a bad shape because White's invasion at 1 renders it ineffective. If Black can defend it, however, by playing at 1, 'a', or 'b', it becomes a very good shape indeed.

('Gekkan Gogaku', Jan. 1979. Translated by James Davies)


NEW JOSEKI

*Recent professional innovations in joseki
selected and reported on by
Abe Yoshiteru, 8-dan*




Dia. 1

Black's descent at 1 is the new move this month. If the reader will play through the sequence from 4 to 14 in the game figure at right I think he will recognize the joseki, and will know that the fixed formula had been for Black to take sente by giving atari with 2 in Dia. 2. The new move forces us to re-examine this formula. First let's hear from the player himself.




Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Kajiware: 'In the old pattern in Dia. 2, if White can set up a ladder block he has a powerful cut at 'a'. To keep him from cutting, Black reinforces at 'b', but then White captures 2 with 'c' in sente, and there goes all Black's potential in the corner. Now if Black descends at 2 in Dia. 3 he can net White 'a' with 'b', and he's not abandoning the triangled stone. Abandoning that stone is what I dislike about Dia. 2.'

After the new move at 15 in the game figure, Black went after center thickness with 17 and the sequence ended with 29. Concerning this result:




*Game Figure (1 - 31). Meijin Preliminary Final
Black: Kajiware, 9-dan. White: Ushinohama, 9-dan*


Fujisawa Shuko, Kisei: 'Black's played one extra move and White has a lot of corner territory. Locally, White has the advantage.'

Takemiya, 9-dan: 'Black has considerable outside influence, but in this particular opening it doesn't work well.'


One problem is whether Black's blocking at 'a' in the figure is sente against the corner or not. Let's suppose Black has blocked at ▲ in Dia. 4 and White has not replied. Black then cuts at 1. If White answers at 2, 3 becomes a tesuji and Black picks up five stones, which is unacceptable to White.




Dia. 4




Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

17 recaptures

White will therefore answer with 2 in Dia. 5. After Black captures two stones with 9 the sequence continues through Dia. 6 and ends with Black recapturing with 17 in Dia. 7. The result is a *seki*. White has too much at stake to risk the *ko* in Dia. 8.

Black 'a' in the game figure is therefore not *sente*, and Black 29 is also *gote*. Black has made one more move than White, but White has a pretty big territory, and in addition the stone in the bottom left corner is white. This adds up to an unfavorable result for Black.

Nevertheless, this new move is a well-thought-out professional idea to which one cannot help feeling attracted. Kajiwara expressed great confidence in it when questioned during a televised commentary on the game; 'merits further study' were his words. I seem to recall that he tried it once before in a game against Kuwabara, 7-dan, but I have forgotten the details.

('Igo Shincho' Mar. 1979. Translated by J. Davies)

The reader may be interested in seeing the rest of this game. Ushinohama came out of the opening with a bit of an advantage, but it took him nearly 250 moves to convert this into a win, as Kajiwara launched one furious attack after another.

Figure 2 (32 – 100). White 38 should be higher, at 39. Black's attack at 39 works perfectly with




Figure 2 (32 – 100)




Figure 3 (101 – 200)

20: throws in (left of 11); 23: captures (at 16)
63: connects (at 56); *ko*: 67, 70, 73, 76, 79, 82, 85, 88; 89: connects (left of 11); *ko*: 91, 94, 97; 99: right of 32

his thickness on the left.

White 54 is a clever move. This fight also ends up with Black getting thickness and White taking profit.




Figure 4 (201 – 279)

17: throws in (above 16); ko: 22, 25, 28;

54: connects; 71: connects

Black 71. Invading here gives White thickness on the outside, thus hurting Black's own central thickness. Black should either attack immediately at 91 or block at 100. Black 100 would make connecting at 56 sente, as White would have to defend against Black 'a'.

Black attacks all out with 93 to 97, but taking the key point of 100 takes the pressure off White.

Figure 3 (101 – 200). Jumping to 10 is enough compensation for losing the white stones at the top. Unfortunately for Black, blocking at 7 is not sente.

Ironically, Black's 'thick' group on the centre right now comes under attack.

Figure 4 (201 – 279). Playing White 2 at 4 would forestall this final attack by Black, but Black does not have enough threats to win the ko fight. The game is over after White 30.

This win in the final elimination round (played on the 22nd November, 1978) earned Ushinohama a place in the 4th Meijin League.

White wins by 8½ points.


Page from Go History

Doteki the Prodigy

The 4th Honinbo Dosaku was the greatest player of the 17th century, the first golden age in the history of Japanese Go, but one of his disciples showed promise of equalling the master or perhaps even outshining him. Unfortunately, the great talent of this disciple, Ogawa Doteki, never reached full maturity, for his career was tragically cut short when he had barely reached adulthood. Only some twenty or so game records of Doteki survive as evidence of his genius, but they are more than sufficient to show that he was a genuine prodigy, one with few peers in Go history.

Doteki was born in Ise Matsuzaka in 1669. His Go talent was recognized at an early age and he was sent to Edo (Tokyo) to become a disciple of the Honinbo house. It is generally considered that by the age of thirteen his skill had already reached the level of 6-dan.

One day Dosaku, then Meijin Godokoro, tried two games on even with Doteki. Since traditionally pupils never took white against their teacher, regardless of their real relative strength, this was an unusual gesture on Dosaku's part – perhaps his aim was to discover just how strong was this astonishing pupil of his. The result was a tie, with



Dosaku v. Doteki Figure 1 (1 – 40)

each player winning the game he played on black by one point. The game in which Dosaku took white has already been given in Go World No. 5. Here is the other.

Dosaku v. Doteki

White: Ogawa Doteki (1669 – 1690)

Black: Honinbo Meijin Dosaku (1645 – 1702)

date: 1682

Figure 1 (1 – 40). White 28 prevents Black from




Figure 2 (41 – 65)

Moves after 65 not recorded.

connecting by attaching under 24. Black 29 in reply is too greedy, for it allows White the severe attack at 30. Black should jump out to 32 with 29.

Figure 2 (41 – 65). Black is alive after 47: if White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', Black 'f'. However, this attack has worked well for White.

Unfortunately, the game record ends with 65. Already the game is very close, due to the trouble Black got into on the bottom left. Go Seigen's assessment is that White has played magnificently, without a single dubious move.

Black wins by one point.

Dosaku's senior disciple, Meijin Inseki


When Doteki entered the Honinbo school, its leading disciple was Kuwahara Dosetsu (1646 – 1719), who is known to history as Meijin Inseki. Since Dosetsu was only a year younger than Dosaku, presumably he was originally a disciple of the third Honinbo Dosetsu and automatically transferred allegiance to Dosaku when the latter assumed the stewardship of the Honinbo school.

There is a story that Dosetsu was unhappy when the youthful Doteki was selected by Dosaku as his heir in 1684 and that he challenged Doteki to a match. However, there is no evidence for this story and certainly no such match took place.

Dosaku later arranged for Dosetsu to be adopted as the heir of the 3rd Inoue head. Relations between the Inoue and Honinbo schools seem to have been very close during the 17th century. The first head of the Inoue school, Nakamura

Doseki (see Go World No. 8), was a disciple of the 1st Honinbo Sansa, while the 3rd Inoue head, Dosa Inseki, was actually the younger brother of Dosaku. When Dosa Inseki retired in 1692, Dosetsu duly became the 4th Inoue head, assuming the name of Dosetsu Inseki. In 1708 he became Meijin and in 1710 Godokoro, but before that he was to play a crucial role in the fortunes of the Honinbo house as the teacher of the 5th Honinbo Dochi. However, this is a story which we will leave for a later issue.

All these complications were still in the future when the thirty-six year old Dosetsu played the following game against the newest Honinbo pupil, the thirteen year old prodigy Doteki. This game is of particular interest because it might well be the source of the most popular contemporary fuseki pattern.



Dosetsu v. Doteki Figure 1 (1 – 40)

Game Two. Dosetsu v. Doteki

White: Kuwahara Dosetsu (Meijin Inseki)

Black: Ogawa Doteki

Date: 1682

Figure 1 (1 – 40)

If Black 3 were on the star-point, the 1–3–5 formation here would be the same as the modern Chinese-style fuseki pattern. Yasunaga Hajime, who is credited with inventing this pattern, could well have taken the hint from this game. It is also interesting to note that while Black 7 at 19 has long been the standard answer to 6, recently Sakata 9-dan and others have been experimenting with Black 7 here.

Black 11. Black's aim is to take sente in order to

switch to the all-important point of 19. In contrast to most of the games of this period, the fuseki of this game is original and entertaining.

Black 23 – 29. An excellent flow of moves for Black. Perhaps White should have played 22 at 25.

White 32. Building up the left side moyo with 'a' is better.

Black 39 is too close to White's strong position at the top; the ordinary reinforcement at 'b' is correct.




Figure 2 (41 – 100)
65: connects; 75: connects

Figure 2 (41 – 100)

Black offers strong resistance to White's invasion at 50, but the result to 65 is a success for White. From the point of view of tewari, Black 55 has become a superfluous stone.

White 82 is the losing move, as Black 83 hollows out White's centre. White 82 should be at 86, forcing Black to answer at 84; White could then extend at 83, expanding his centre (if next Black 'a', then White 'b'). This would give White good prospects of winning.

Figure 3 (101 – 160)

Black establishes a clear lead when he erases the centre with the sequence to 11, but then he goes wrong with 13, as making a forcing move with 15 first is the correct order. White narrows the gap by capturing two stones with 14 etc. However, as nothing untoward occurs in the end-game, he is unable to overtake his opponent.

Figure 4 (161 – 223)

A ko starts with 92, but Black of course has




Figure 3 (101 – 160)




Figure 4 (161 – 223)

87: ko (left of 62); 91: connects at 62; ko (around 93); 96, 99, 102, 105; 109: connects

read it all out. The game is over when he connects at 109.

Black wins by 4 points.

Representing the Honinbo House

In 1684 Dosaku appointed Doteki as his heir and in December the latter made his first appearance in the o-shiro-go or castle games played once a year in the presence of the shogun, the head of the Tokugawa government. This honour, equivalent to playing in a title match nowadays, was granted only to the heads of the four Go schools, their official heirs and other players recognised

as being 7-dan or stronger.

Doteki's first game was against Yasui Shunchi, a leading player of the Yasui school. Doteki won this game by 7 points with Black. The following year he again met Shunchi and this second clash between the two produced a great fighting game.

Game Three. Doteki v. Shunchi

White: Honinbo Doteki

Black: Yasui Shunchi

Date: 30th November, 1685

played at Edo Castle




Figure 1 (1 - 35)

Figure 1 (1 - 35)

Black 13 is too passive, as White is able to press Black into a low position on the side with 14. Black should try something different with 13, attaching at 'a', for example.


Black 31. If at 1 in Dia. 1, Black has no answer to White 2 – if Black 3, then White 4 and 6. If instead Black 3 at 'a', White cuts at 3.

Dia. 2. If Black plays on top at 3, White plays 4 to 10, winning the fight by one move.

For the above reasons Black does not answer 30 directly. White in turn cannot answer 31 by blocking at 35.

Dia. 3. If White 1, Black cuts at 2 as a probe. White 3 is correct shape, but now Black can go ahead with 4. This time he wins the fight, as Black 10 is sente.

At first sight the 31–35 exchange looks somewhat bizarre, but in fact it is an inevitable sequence based upon deep reading. This magnificent exchange alone makes this game worth studying.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2

Dia. 3




Figure 2 (36 - 100)

Figure 2 (36 - 100)

White 36. The large point of 'a' at the bottom is more urgent. Even if Black attacks White's group at the top, White should have no trouble living.

White attacks with 48, but the result here is not quite satisfactory for him, as he creates a weak group which is chased out into the centre. In this figure Black takes the lead.

White 80. If omitted, Black kills White with Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e', Black 80, White 'f', Black 'g'.

White 90. A good cut but White 'h' has greater priority.

Figure 3 (101 - 150)

Black 13 is small – the game would be over if Black played instead at 26, capturing the five white stones. Black is ahead, so he should simplify, but with 13 he falls in with White's strategy of




Figure 3 (100 - 150)
23: captures 22




Figure 5 (201 - 272)

32: connects; 71: at 41; 72: connects (above 14); White wins and connects the ko






Figure 4 (151 - 200)



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

creating complications in the centre. White out-plays Black in the sequence to 38, taking the substance and giving Black the shadow. White thus takes over the lead.

Figure 4 (151 - 200)

Black 51 is Shunchi's last mistake, as the squeeze to 56 is excellent for White. Black missed

a better sequence here: Black 1 to 9 in Dia. 4 reduce the corner almost to zero and leave White without definite eye-shape (if 4 at 'a', Black lives with 4).

Dia. 5. If White 4 here, a ko results, but Black has more threats.

After Black misses this ko, the game definitely tilts in favour of White. Both sides made a number of mistakes, but their fierce fighting spirit makes this a game to remember.

White wins by 3 points

Doteki played another 'castle' game against Shunchi in 1686, losing this one by three points (on white). He also played two against Yasui Chitetsu (see GW11), one on black in 1688, which he won by 12 points, and one on white, in 1689, which he won by 17 points. This gave him a record of 4-1 in 'castle' games against two of the top Yasui players - clearly Doteki, if he had lived would have had little trouble in maintaining the Honinbo supremacy established by Doetsu and Dosaku.

Doteki died on the 7th May, 1690, at the age of twenty-one. The cause of his death is thought to be tuberculosis, which also claimed the lives of his fellow disciples Sakugen (who was made the Honinbo heir after Doteki's death), Hasseki and Honseki. These successive tragedies caused a crisis in the Honinbo house which the slighted senior pupil, Dosetsu, played a crucial role in resolving.

Next issue: Dosaku's deathbed request.

